Hearing Transcripts from United States v. SFWMD, et al.,

Case No. 88-1886-CIV-HOEVELER
 

 

      STYLE:    US vs. SFWMD
      CASE:      88-1886-CIV-WMH
     JUDGE:    TED E. BANDSTRA
      DATE:      April 13, 1990

      NAVIGATION:
                        Appearances
                        Proceeding
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                        120 140 160 180
                        Certificate (page 185)

 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION

 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT
DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants,

______________________________________

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            Case No.
            88-1886-CIV-WMH
            MIAMI, FLORIDA              
            April 13, 1990
 

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON PENDING MOTIONS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE TED E. BANDSTRA,
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

 

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APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff:


RICHARD HARRISON,
Assistant US Attorney,
155 South Miami Avenue,
Miami, Florida, 33131.


SUSAN PONZOLI,
Assistant US Attorney,
155 South Miami Avenue,
Miami, Florida, 33131

For the Defendant:

JERRY JACKSON, ESQ.

TOM ANKERSON. ESQ.,

DAVID CROWLEY,ESQ.,

Transcriber:

S. Magda

 


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THE COURT: All right. We’re here in the case

this morning of United States v. South Florida Water

Management District, 88-1886-CIV-HOEVELER, and specifically

on pending motions, which I have at least three of in front

of me, those motions bring the United States’ emergency

motion filed back in June -- to the extent that that’s

pending and still an emergency, we’ll address in a

moment -- the United States’ motion for a temporary

protective order filed in October of 1989, and the motion

of the defendants, the District, filed in November of 1989.

And we will address these.

I spent some time this morning reading through

most of these -- well, yesterday and this morning -- only

to find that -- and having spend about forty-five minutes

on one of them, finding that a great deal of this perhaps

is no longer at issue. But, hopefully -- hopefully none of

it’s at issue, but I don’t think that will be the case.

May I have appearances of counsel that are going

to argue here this morning.

MR. HARRISON: Richard Harrison for the United

States, and beside me is Susan Ponzoli for the United

States.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, I’m Jerry Jackson. I

represent the South Florida Water Management District and

 


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the Defendant John Ladraska (phonetic). There’s also a

forms motion pending, another motion that we filed in late

June or early July, a motion for a protective order.

THE COURT: Yes. That -- I didn’t -- I did see

that. In fact, it’s fashioned somewhat as a response to

one of the motions to compel.

MR. JACKSON: Yes, that’s correct.

THE COURT: That’s right. All right. Your name

is Kerry Jackson?

MR. JACKSON: It’s Jerry Jackson with a "J".

THE COURT: Jerry Jackson. All right.

MR. ANKERSEN: Tom Ankersen for the municipal

intervenors, City of Belle Glade and City of Clewiston. We

have no motions pending, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I’m sorry. Your last

name, sir?

MR. ANKERSEN: Ankersen.

THE COURT: Ankersen?

MR. ANKERSEN: That’s correct.

THE COURT: All right. Who else do we have?

MR. CROWLEY: Your Honor, for the record, I’m

David Crowley representing the State of Florida Department

of Environmental Regulations.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Crowley.

MR. CROWLEY: We likewise have no motions pending

 


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today.

THE COURT: Okay. Any other attorneys here?

All right. Perhaps it might be best to start at

the end rather than the beginning here, although I’m not

sure which order is best to proceed. But, let me start

with the plaintiffs, because it is their case, and ask the

United States to advise me of which of its motions are --

whether its motion -- November motion is still pending; for

that matter, whether its June motion is still pending; and

what seems to be the dispute at this point.

MR. HARRISON: Okay.

THE COURT: And I might preface this by saying I

don’t need extensive detail at this time. I want to get

some feel for it this morning.

MR. HARRISON: Oh, okay.

THE COURT: But, I have read your motions, and I

see the disputes as it relates to document production,

depositions of certain witnesses, and so forth. So, I’ve

read that . But, where are we at with it right now, Mr.

Harrison?

MR. HARRISON: Okay, your Honor. The initial

June motion to compel, which went to documents, was, at

least to some degree, not waived, but mooted, by the

September 5th reply that was filed at the end of the second

stay. We do believe that that reply, if you will, breathed

 


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new life in several issues, about five categories of

substantive issues that are in there. The rest, we don’t

waive them, but we could hope that we could defer any

further argument on those until after we get the rest of

the documents production, and it’s very likely that some of

those will disappear.

With respect to the motion for a protective order

and the attached pretrial schedule, that whole briefing

series that went with the motion for a protective order --

I think there were about six different briefs with the

replies, sur-replies, etcetera – that is all still very

much at issue. The procedural issues with respect to the

pretrial schedule are most compelling, and we do want to

argue those.

With respect to -- I think basically, your Honor,

that is it. The series of the pretrial -- of all of that

pretrial stuff. Beginning with the protective order and

their responses, is going to take up, I think, a good

portion of the Government’s argument today; and we --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HARRISON: -- We need rulings on that.

THE COURT: Has there been any further discussion

and agreement on any of these matters? Perhaps a better

way to do this is just for you side to begin with whatever

motion you think is appropriate here to begin with and what

 


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it is that is still at issue as it relates to these

discovery disputes.

MR. HARRISON: Yes, your Honor. How much time

would you care to allow me -- to begin arguments now or to

simply summarize?

THE COURT: Well, let me also state that, as I

read through this, it seems that a great deal of this could

be done based on these papers. To the extent that it

requires a court order, I need to know what it is that’s

still at issue here, what needs to be decided by the court,

and what doesn’t have to be decided by the court. I don’t

want to make rulings that have already -- that would

conflict with agreements.

MR. HARRISON: I agree. Thus far, you --

there’s -- other than certain of the substantive areas and

the manner of production, in others words whether boxes will

be produced by specific category or as kept in the usual

course of business, that’s all relatively moot at this

point. We don’t waive it, but that is -- a lot of that was

moot, other that the five categories in that original

motion to compel of the United States. There are virtually

no disagreements on other procedural matters. That, I

think, is going to take up most of the court’s time.

What I would plan to do is not go specifically

motion by motion. I think we gave you some twenty-two

 


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different documents, and I -- rather than to go motion by

motion, we would like to tell you what immediate relief we

think that we need from this hearing, both substantive and

procedural.

THE COURT: All right. I think that’s a better

way to proceed actually; and then I would, of course -- I

realize that the defendants have a response to that and

also a request for relief. Hopefully this would come down

to some kind of an agreement or, if not and agreement, a

court order for a scheduling order in the case, I see one

proposed by both sides -- a different one proposed by both

sides. But, let’s proceed in that manner. Any problem

with that as far as the defendants are concerned?

MR. JACKSON: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Harrison, why don’t

you tell me what the -- where a dispute still exits in

this discovery and that relief you’re requesting.

MR. HARRISON: Okay, your Honor. I would ask the

court that -- we’re trying to essentially summarize nearly

a year or over a year of various disputes, most of which

are now procedural; and I honestly believe that I will need

at least forty-five minutes to go through this. It is a

global argument, but, we feel very compelled to show the

court the importance of the procedural problems and to

contrast the two discovery schedules that you have before

 


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you -- or actually three with our expedited schedule. We

have been, I guess, arguing for over a year, despite what

we believe have been good-faith attempts by the United

States to try to at least resolve some of these disputes.

Now discovery has been deadlocked for five months, and the

case simply has to go forward.

Judge, the case is extremely important. The

United States needs to take this case to trial; and we need

to take it to trial as rapidly as we can, but we can’t

afford -- we would be guilty of almost malpractice if we

agreed to take this case to trial in eight or nine months

in a shabbily prepared manner. We do have the burden of

proof, and we have to have some orderly discovery. We’ve

been unable to reach a schedule, and that’s what I want to

address today.

I ask the court to keep in mind three factors in

trying to decide who, in all of this melee of discovery

battles, has really tried in good faith to at least elicit

some cooperation; and I think that is central to any

discovery dispute.

The one factor is that, as I will address more

specifically, the United States has at least formally

proposed three different discovery schedules to the

defendants. Not only have we not got counter-offers during

those discussions, we’ve simply been told that they won’t

 


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discuss it. The only one that they ever proposed was in

reaction to the one we ultimately filed in court. We don’t

believe that schedule is a serious schedule; and we don’t

think that there’s any way that that schedule promotes

orderly trial preparation; and in fact, we think that it

will promote chaos. Whether it’s intended to do so or not,

we’re not going to talk, but it will promote chaos. It’ll

prevent the plaintiff from preparing its case in an orderly

fashion and meeting its burden of proof.

The second fact that we’d like you to keep in

mind is that the United States has granted, at the request

of the defendants, two stays of discovery. I think that

that shows some cooperation. The United States has also --

and I know this sounds a little nitpicky, but our request

for production predates theirs by two months.

But, the bottom -- line fact is, your Honor, we have

approximately one -- third of the documents that they

themselves, over and above all of their vagueness

objections, have estimated are responsive to our request.

They’ve estimated about a half a million. Thus far they’ve

produced for inspection a hundred and fifty thousand.

On the other hand, your Honor, they have now been

allowed to look at all of the documents at the National

Park Service at the Park and the US Fish & Wildlife

Service. They only lack one agency -- they’ve had

 


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two-thirds of the agencies they’ve requested -- and that is

the Corps of Engineers, and we’ve offered those times. I

will discuss those a little bit more.

The fact is we now have a log jam. It hurts the

plaintiffs more that it hurts the defendants. We have the

burden of proof in this case. If we continue to fight

about discovery right up until the brink of trial and

continue in discovery battles that cause these types of

pleadings, we stand to lose. There’s no up side for the

United States in escalating a discovery war when we need to

get a case to trial but in a proper manner.

There’s -- we’re going to try to summarize this,

your Honor, in roughly five substantive areas that we need,

and those will be very brief, and those do come out of the

original request for production of documents and motion to

compel, and that’s what we’re -- that’s all we’re going to

address substantively today. Procedurally we’re going to

address five issues as well. I want to at least briefly

tell the court what those procedural ones ore. Then I plan

to discuss the substantive ones and argue them; and then I

want to specifically go back to the procedural ones,

because I think they’re really the most important to us.

The procedural matters that we feel that we have

to have a ruling on from your Honor as a result of this

hearing to move the case forward is, one, the discovery

 


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schedule. We don’t believe there’s any realistic

possibility that we can agree any longer, and I will

address that further.

The basic order of that discovery schedule would

have to be really that the documents -- the first round of

documents were complete; then we did use interrogatories

merely as a means of revealing witnesses -- who’s a fact

witness, who’s an expert witness, in what capacity are they

going to testify to, and the basic 20(b) -- 24 -- or excuse

me -- 26(b)(4)(a)(i) information. We have no intention of

making them go to further motions to depose experts. We

clearly will give then our expert witnesses. But, it --

but, you have to know who they are before you start

targeting everybody in the agency for deposition.

The order is, of course, the most important. It

will resolve some of the other procedural problems.

The second procedural ruling we feel that we

absolutely have to have is that the District must be bound

District-wide by a request for production. We didn’t sue

the individual divisions of the District. There’s some odd

forty divisions. The District has to be bound regardless

of where a document is located. The United States has long

ago agreed that the whole Federal Government is bound,

regardless of whether we have the documents in Jacksonville

with the Corps of Engineers -- no matter where they are, we

 


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agree to produce documents if they’re responsive to that

request.

The third ruling we must have or that we feel is

necessary to keep the case moving is that, because of this

massive documents request and because everybody in this

lawsuit are public agencies supported by tax dollars and we

don’t want to pull these people off of their jobs any more

than necessary., the lawyers should accept the burden of

documents production. We should accept the burden of

getting the documents and reviewing the documents before we

go with subpoena duces tecums and force the witnesses to

bring in scads and hordes of documents. That’s double

production, it’s counterproductive, and it does nothing by

escalate the cost to all for these tax-supported agencies.

The fourth thing we have that we would like and

that will be solved by the discovery schedule, if it’s

adopted, is we do want the first round of documents

completed immediately; and that’s on both sides. We want

them to go to the Corps, and we want to be able to go and

finish our two-thirds of the documents they say they

already have for us. We can argue about if there’s any

that have been withheld later, but let’s finish the first

request.

The last thing we need -- it’ll also be settled

by the thing -- is we would like some way to compel

 


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teleconferences to resolve minor discovery disputes. I’ll

get into that later. I realize the court’s power is

limited here, but I think it’s going to be a very valuable

tool, and it does come out of the Manual for Complex

Litigation.

Just a brief summary of the procedural things

that are absolutely critical to this case. All of these

parties are tax-supported. Judge Smargon, in two hearings

and in an order, has recognized that. He has mandated the

parties to be cooperative. We have a higher duty than in a

normal case to be cooperative. We have to. It is costing

the public a ton of money, regardless of who’s filing the

pleadings; and because of that, your Honor, we think the

procedural issues are critical, and we can not longer handle

a log jam.

The substantive issues that we believe we need a

ruling on -- and I will go ahead and, as I mention these,

make the brief argument and get these over with. The

substantive issues -- No. 1 would be the records that we

allude to roughly in Paragraphs 57, to some degree in 56,

59, 33, and 34, of our request for production. 56 and 57

are the most important of those. And these really are --

they’ve objected to our definition of agency positions -- I

think it’s pretty clear, and I’m willing to explain what

agency positions are -- and the administrative hearings and

 


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orders. What we have asked for is the positions, official

positions the agency has taken with respect to regulating

agriculture.

You can summarize the gravamen of this case in

one line. That’s the failure -- knowing failure of the

defendants to use the laws the legislature gave them in

1972 to regulate agricultural pollution. It’s been

eighteen years. We’re now suing to enforce those -- to

make them enforce the regulations. It’s critical if they

have agency positions, whether they’re memoranda or

whatever, that define whether they believe they can

regulate or whether they can’t regulate and why.

The administrative hearings and the orders are

equally important. If there are records of administrative

hearings and orders, whether they’ve either regulated

agriculture successfully or not, we believe those are very

important; and in fact, they’re already required under

Florida Statute 120.53.

We don’t think there’s anything vague about the

definition of agency positions; and if it is, we hope that

this has cleared that up. Other water management districts

have attempted to regulate --

THE COURT: Could you repeat for --

MR. HARRISON: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Could you repeat for me-- you’re now

 


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referring to the defendants’ objections to certain of your

requests, and I think you cited 56 and 57. But, which

other ones are you -- which other numbers --

MR. HARRISON: Okay. Those are the primary ones.

I think that they also -- the agency -- the administrative

hearings and orders also touch on paragraphs 59, 33, and

34; and those are our paragraphs from our request for

production, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HARRISON: The second --

THE COURT: And was there another phrase -- other

than agency positions, did you mention another phrase?

MR. HARRISON: Yes, there was. The

administrative hearings and orders.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HARRISON: We want -- excuse me -- all

records that they would have of those.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HARRISON: The second substantive area that

we believe we -- that is -- that we have breathed new life

in and we still need a ruling on is really -- and I’ll give

you the numbers -- would be our Requests No. 37 and 57; and

basically that deals with -- 56 is kind of a dual thing

there. It deals with regulating the EAA -- but, it’s the

operations control manual that’s mentioned in our request

 


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for production.

This is a manual that allows the District to

remotely control some odd fifty structures. Remotely, an

farmer calls and says, "We’re getting flooding up here at

so-and-so-and-so-and-so." They can remote with a microwave

beam. We want to know the criteria for operating that

structure and what it takes to get them to open or close

that structure, because -- well, I’ll explain the reason in

just a second.

The other would be the discretionary authority

portion.

And I would direct your Honor on all of these

substantive issues -- the real main document where this is

set out was the September 5th reply to -- let me get you

the exact title. This was the -- excuse me for one moment.

MS. PONZOLI: I think it’s this one.

MR. HARRISON: Yeah. I thought I had that

written down. I’m sorry, your Honor. It’s the US’s reply

to the defendants’ opposition to our motion to compel; and

it was filed on September 5th, the day that that second

stay ended. These are the ones that we want rulings on. I

don’t think it’s necessary to go back though that whole

first request for production, except to look at the items

that are covered in this document. At least that’s the

Government’s position. And in there we do discuss the

 


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operations control manual, as well as the discretionary

authority.

Now, the defendants are going to tell you that

the United States has continued to maintain this is a water

quality suit only. These two items do go to water

quantity, but they go to water -- it’s a well-known fact

that manipulating the water table in the EAA affects water

quality.

If an agricultural interest -- if a farmer has a

rain forecast for one inch tomorrow, they begin what we

call panic pumping and pump the water table down two feet

or more below the roots of the sugarcane to attempt to

protect the crop from flooding. What happens -- we think

that the District’s operation and latitude for operating

this affects this end that they could control the panic

pumping by use of their permits, etcetera.

It is relevant to quality. Every time they do

unnecessary pumping of the table, it loads the water

with phosphorous and nitrogen, we believe unnecessarily.

We believe that the defendants accommodate this.

They’re going to tell you they can’t make a move

on the discretionary authority without the blessing of the

Corps of Engineers. They’ve maintained that it was the

Corps the whole time. They’ve tried to get them named as a

defendant in this case. When that failed, they have now

 


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asserted a counterclaim; and it is their defense.

Simply, to address that, in 1979, they made a

fifteen percent shift. They shifted fifteen percent of the

whole water in this basin that was being back-pumped into

Lake Okeechobee. They had to stop that, because it was

killing the lake with nutrients. They shifted that

downstream to the conservation areas. Your Honor, that is

a major shift in water quantity and timing. That was done

without the Corps of Engineers’ blessing or approval.

That’s within the discretionary authority of the South

Florida Water Management District.

We think -- that’s what we want to explore -- is

the levels of their discretionary authority to control

these water tables. It’s very relevant. So, that’s the

second issue that we believe we need a ruling on, and we

deserve documents in both of those categories.

THE COURT: All right. And specifically now

You’re taking about the manual and then the collective

request in you Request No. 56, all documents relating to

it’s discretionary authority.

MR. HARRISON: Yes, your Honor, and particularly

regarding regulation of agriculture --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HARRISON: -- and the EAA.

The third area your can find in our Paragraph 50

 


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of the request for production, and that is we just simply

ask for all documents regarding the Loxahatchee lease and

the memorandum of agreement, which is our two contract

counts in this lawsuit. If you’ll look at their Paragraphs

10 through 12 -- and I believe they had another one. I’m

not sure exactly where it was -- but, they ask for the

exact same thing with just a few more words.

They say that we’re vague and ambiguous. Judge,

we’d like to be able to narrow the request , but we have no

idea of what types of documents they have. The issues on

the lease -- they have said that they’d give us everything from

from the Legal Office, but they won't give us anything from

any of the other divisions that are relevant to the lease

and the MOA.

There are numerical standards, scientific

standards, set forth in the MOA. We want to know the bases

for those standards, their belief that they’re

enforceable -- anything regarding the lease and the MOA, we

believe is relevant.

If they have marginal documents, if they can tell

us some way to narrow this request, fine; and we don’t want

a document that simply mentions the lease and goes on.

But, if it goes to why that lease was written, why it’s

enforceable, what’s enforceable about it, the scientific

nutrient standards or other standards contained therein,


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that’s critical to our contract counts .

And those, as I said, your Honor, would be our

Paragraph 50 and roughly their Paragraphs 10 through 12 in

their request for production, but you’ll also find that

alluded to in that September 5th reply.

The fourth substantive issue that we feel that we

need are maps. It’s our Paragraph 8. We ask for all maps

and charts, whether they’re complete or incomplete. We

have shown them ours and our satellite imagery, etcetera,

whether it’s complete or incomplete. And the main thing

the maps do, your Honor, is to update what the damage has

been thus far of the nutrient impact. We call it the

nutrient front, if you will.

According to their own data, as of about a year

or two years ago -- I believe it’s about 1988 -- there were

some odd twenty-six thousand acres of already what is

termed as irreversible damage. No one knows how to restore

a wetland once it goes to a cattail monoculture. The whole

import of that is that this nutrient front is moving down.

These maps have been tracking the damage. It’s their

figures, not us, that that four to five acres per day

are being swallowed up, that the saw grass is being

replaced with monocultures of cattails; and the wildlife

habitat is gone once the cattails are in. The damage, we

believe, begins much sooner that the cattails, but we want

 


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to see their maps to see what the latest estimate of the

damage is.

Out of that twenty-six thousand acres, your

Honor, six thousand acres have already been lost in the

Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge. And as I said, the

rate is moving at approximately four to five acres per day.

So, we want their unfinished maps.

The last area, Judge, is difficult to pin down

specifically. In the request for production, it’s clearly

within our definition of documents -- meetings, minutes of

meetings, and things like this. But, what this is all

executive staff meeting minutes. Now, they might argue

that somehow they’re not specifically covered in the

request for production. We clearly did ask for all

documents relating to certain water quality issues. We

think that it’s fairly covered, but we’re going to specify

executive staff meeting minutes since 1975.

We believe they have monthly executive staff

meetings. We have been informed that, if there had been

policy decisions memorialized in memoranda, this is where

they are likely to be found. They are critical to our

case. We have asked Mr. Jackson several times for them.

He’s never objected. They simply haven’t furnished them,

and we want those.

THE COURT: And would these be those -- this

 


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would not relate to any specific request, but rather to

more than one request, such as I’m looking -- just

scanning -- one two, three, four -- they all refer to

meeting notes. Would that be --

MR. HARIRISON: Exactly, your Honor. It’s clearly

within our definition of documents. It’s clearly within

the general request on meeting notes regarding water

quality. There’s no question. If they say it’s vague and

over-broad, we’re going to define that for them right now.

We have defined it on the phone several times, and we think

they’re known specifically as executive staff meeting

minutes.

The rest of the substantive items, as I said in

the motion to compel, as well as in that request for

production, your Honor, we feel that should remain open

don’t need a ruling on today. We -- after we get the rest

of the five hundred thousand documents, we may not want to

look at another document, unless there is a smoking gun;

and we always reserve the right to go back.

THE COURT: So, what you’re asking for then is

for a decision on these five areas; and there remain

certain disputes as to other of your requests, but you’re

not presently either requesting those documents or

requesting the court to order -- you’re requesting the

documents -- but, requesting a court order or you believe

 


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that perhaps that’ll be resolved in some manner.

MR. HARRISON: That is exactly right, and we

believe that it would be a little premature to keep griping

about some of these others. We’ve got about three hundred

and fifty thousand documents, according to their estimate,

to still be furnished. We’re kind of tired of the

late-night reading of documents. I’ll guarantee you that

we’re starting to cut with a broad ax and not with a rapier

on what we need; and when go to identify documents at

the District, we will not even be tagging near the number

of documents. I feel certain, that we have tagged.

But, according to their own estimates, regardless

of all of their objections with vagueness and overbreadth

that are replete throughout their objection to our request

for production, even all of the vagueness set aside, they

have estimated five hundred thousand responsive documents.

That’s all we want -- is to give us what you’ve already

estimated are responsive. We won’t argue about the

vagueness. We won’t argue about the scope. We’re going to

make this simple. Let us review the rest of those

documents. If we at that point in time feel that they are

withholding something, of course, we’ll try to resolve it;

and if not, we’ll be back before your Honor.

But, that, I think, is the gravamen of the

substantive rulings that we need; and I don’t really

 


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want --need to , I don’t believe, dwell on that any longer.

The -- except to say that we do have -- we have had a

hundred and fifty thousand, so we do have approximately

one-third that we have been -- produced for inspection

about one-third. Excuse me, your Honor.

Okay. Now, let me at least -- let me go back on

the procedural areas a little bit more specifically. I am

going to spend a little -- most of my time on the discovery

schedule. First off, the goal of any --

THE COURT: Let just – so I’m clear as to

where we’re going with this.

MR. HARRISON: Okay.

THE COURT: A number of the things that I’ve read

about earlier, such as manner of production and so forth,

you did not mention those in the five procedural areas that

you --

MR. HARRISON: No, your Honor. We have, a long

time ago, over our objection initially -- but, you know, we

didn’t like being in a hotel. We wanted to be in the

District offices and all of this, and we -- we have -- we

don’t waive those objections, your Honor. And there was

the other primary objection that we wanted documents

produced by category of the request, not as kept in the

usual course of business.

The Sears case, the Evanston, Illinois case, some

 


25

 

of those that were in the brief, clearly say that under a

case this -- of this magnitude we would probably have a

right to that. The District has opposed. We have now

begun the procedure on both sides of producing documents as

they are kept in the usual course of business. They do

provide us now a tracking system. Albeit we can’t go see

which file cabinet, they tell us whose drawers and what

dates; and that’s -- it’s not as workable as if we were,

there and we could go through and pick them ourselves and

we’d know the order, but it’s at least working.

THE COURT: All right. Then I’m not going to --

MR. HARRISON: So, we don’t believe there needs

to be a ruling on that. It was our objection. I don’t

think the District is certainly going to raise it.

THE COURT: All right. And just so the defense

side is clear here, what I want to do is hear from the

United States what it is that they believe needs resolution

and what its specific requests are. You would have a

response, I’m sure, to each of these substantive areas and

procedural areas perhaps. In addition, you may be

requesting additional relief. So, I want -- that’ll be the

kind of order that will proceed here. All right.

All right. What about these procedural areas --

MR. HARRISON: Okay. The first one of course,

is the pretrial schedule. This is the overwhelmingly most

 


26

 

important. The schedule that is adopted, regardless if

it’s ours, theirs, or your Honor’s, or some compromise

thereof, in a case like this with all taxpayers, all public

agencies, has got to be efficient. It’s got to be designed

to keep costs down if at all possible. It has to somehow

prevent the continuation of this discovery briefing war.

Nowhere in litigation do you get less for you money than

in discovery wars, and the Lord knows Ms. Ponzoli and I and

the rest of the Government attorneys don’t get anything

except more work when we engage in discovery wars, and it

impedes our progress of actually preparing the substantive

case for trial.

It has to try to prevent duplication of

production. It’s very expensive. It has to prevent

duplication of depositions. It has to do its best to

prevent dual depositions or unduly lengthy ones of all of

these public personnel, both the District’s and ours.

They’re performing very important functions right now for

the environment.

Our schedule, we believe, does that. I ask you

to bear in mind that we did offer them three schedules.

The first one, December 16th, 1988, as reported in the

first part of the joint scheduling conference, which you do

have before you and it is -- well, I’m not -- I’m not going

to refer to the specifics of each of those. The one I’m

 


27

 

going to actually refer to, your Honor, would -- is going

to be that expedited schedule, which came in one of our

replies, but --

THE COURT: Let me see if I can find it. I’m

looking at and exhibit, Government Exhibit 4, which is

probably -- what is it called? It’s called an expedited?

MR. HARRISON: Yes, it’s the exhibit -- I don’t

know if the little numbers are still on the corner of the

documents the Government furnished to you. It should be

attached to Document No. 14, which was the -- I can give

you the exact name of that.

THE COURT: Or else if you have a copy of it,

because if I could look at something specific, it would be

easier, you know.

MR. HARRISON: Yes, your Honor, we do. Bear in

mind that this document is now some five months old.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HARRISON: And when I discuss it, I’ m going

to, in fact, push those dates back five months, because

it’s very important for us to --

THE COURT: All right. I’d like to get your

suggestions on where you think that dates have to be

changed; and obviously some do, because we’re now looking

at this in April, but --

MR. JACKSON: Excuse me, your Honor. I don’t

 


28

 

mean to interrupt Counsel .

MR. HARRISON: Do you have one?

MR. JACKSON: But, can we just identify which

document --

MR. HARRISON: You’ve got it. It’s in the --

(Mr. Jackson conferring with Ms. Ponzoli off the

record.)

Yeah, it’s the reply to your response to the

motion of protective order.

THE COURT: It’s the document itself that you

need to look at; and if you have another copy, perhaps it

would be easier for them.

MS. PONZOLI: It’s going to be (d), Jerry. It’ll

be (d).

MR. HARRISON: Let me know if you find it, Jerry.

I have one that’s been -- well. It’s somewhere in here.

Get my Document 14. They can use the document.

MR. JACKSON: Go ahead.

MS. PONZOLI: Don’t you need one?

MR. JACKSON: Go ahead.

MR. HARRISON: Do you have it?

MR. JACKSON: We’ll find it. Go ahead.

(Counsel conferring off the record and looking for the

document.)

MR. HARRISON: You Honor, I just would remind

 


29

 

the court, as -- as I -- that -- to show that the

Government has at least tried, we did offer a schedule on

December 16th ’88, which is reflected in the first joint

report of the scheduling filed January 9th, ’89. In

response to that -- and that was fairly early in the

case -- they absolutely refused to discuss a discovery

schedule, period. They wouldn’t even sign the report of

the joint -- the joint report of scheduling.

The second time we offered a formal schedule was

at the second scheduling conference required by Local Rule

14, and that was on July 10th, ’89. That schedule is

reflected in a report filed -- second report of joint

scheduling conference filed August 1, ’89. That -- also

they even refused to discuss it. They wouldn’t make a

counter-offer. We were nine months into the case at that

time, and they said it was premature to discuss a schedule.

The third time was orally prior to my filing the

United State’s motion for a temporary protective order.

During the 10(i)(7) conference, where I spoke with Mr.

Jackson to see if there was any way we could agree and that

we needed a pretrial schedule, I went through it. It was

again rebuked. There was absolutely no way to come to an

agreement, and that’s the point when we appealed to the

court and filed the motion for a temporary protective order

and added a pretrial schedule to it. That is this Document

 


30

 

No. 11, if it’s up in the little corner, that we provided

you.

But, they then replied with a schedule that we

believe will add -- will cause this chaos to not only

continue but to escalate. We believe that schedule was

merely a reaction to our filing one in court. But,

nevertheless, we think that’s unworkable.

In our final reply, which is the one that you’re

now looking at, we did decide to try to tighten it as much

as we could tighten it; and we filed this expedited

schedule. We are willing to live with this expedited

schedule. I think that there’s a little modification that

is needed, but you do have to remember that that is now

five months old; and it was filed November 28th. We would

request, if that schedule is adopted, that it be pushed

back by the five months. We don’t mean to delay this case,

but we have to be prepared for trial properly.

On that particular schedule, we believe that that

causes the least disruption of the parties’ agents -- of

the parties’ people. The first thing that it really does

is it requires all documents production -- the first

round -- to be complete by July 1, 1990, if you push it

back five months. Now, that would take care of a lot of

these other problems. We’d have to go the District and

finish ours, they’d have to go to go to the Corps and finish

 


31

 

theirs, or we might be out the rest of those documents.

All further discovery, if there are second

requests or other documents identified later, must be

complete no later that March 1, 1991. Interrogatories and

requests for admissions can begin now. They will end on

March 1, 1991.

THE COURT: Which paragraphs now are you

referring to that’ll go to March 1?

MR. HARRISON: Okay. I believe, your Honor, it’s

going to be Paragraph No. 3. It would be talking about

interrogatories and requests for admissions; and again you

have to push that October 1, ’90 date back the five --

THE COURT: All right. So, the Octobers – on

your proposal, the Octobers become March. Okay.

MR. HARRISON: Yes your Honor.

The Paragraph 4 discusses when depositions would

begin. We would like depositions to begin commensurate

with the end of the first documents round, which is July 1,

1990. So, that date in Paragraph 4 would go the July 1.

That’s when depos will begin. Depositions we believe,

will last a year or that that is a proper time frame.

There may be at least sixty to seventy depositions in this

case on both sides, and I think a year is going to be

necessary, and I think we’re going to be pushed for that.

But, so, they would end July 1, 1991.

 


32

 

Your Honor, that Paragraph 4 also contains

something that we are very insistent on. It’s the Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4). We do not mean to put

impediments in the way, but interrogatories have got to be

required to at least identify witnesses, to see who the

witnesses are, whether they’re fact or expert; and in

response to interrogatories, we can also find obviously if

there are expert consultants, which you would then have a

26(b)(4)(b) problem of deposing -- consultants which we’re

not expecting to testify.

This is critical information for any trial lawyer

preparing for a deposition. You simply can’t notice a

party and not have any idea of whether it’s going to be a

witness or not. If you do, it leads to freewheeling

depositions. It’s going to escalate the objections.

You’re going to have objections to the form of the

question. You’re going to have certified refusals to

answer. You’re going to have objections to notices when

someone notices what you deem to be a consultant hired in

anticipation but not expected to testify.

Judge, the Rules were amended in 1970. They were

approved by the United States Supreme Court. They are

tantamount to Supreme Court case law. It says facts or

opinions gathered in the anticipation of litigation by

experts can only be obtained by the 26(b)(4)(a)(i)

 


33

 

interrogatories.

The defendants, in that whole briefing schedule,

have simply cast this aside as, "Ah, they’re a substitute."

they’re not a substitute, Judge. They’re a prerequisite.

Rarely do I require this, because in my practice,

which is mainly under domain, we exchange expert reports

and we sometimes forego this and there’s usually only one

expert you’re dealing with. In a case like this, both

sides have admitted we may have thirty to forty expert

witnesses on the stand ultimately, sixty to seventy

depositions of experts. You can’t go in and begin serving

everybody in the agency with deposition notices.

THE COURT: Let me ask you two questions about

that.

MR. HARRISON: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: First of all, the defendants have

said that Rule 26 is inapplicable, because these are not

retained experts but are either present or former

employees.

MR. HARRISON: No. Okay. Let’s take Mr. Dan

Shite (phonetic) for example, which is ;one of the three

proposed deponents. Dan Shite is clearly deposable right

now on fact that he knew or gathered prior to this

litigation being anticipated, but Dan Shite, since October

of 1988 -- really since August of ’88 has been exclusively

 


34

 

assigned as our litigation case agent.

I submit that the Kansas/Nebraska decision that

they cited -- District Court, 1984 -- was, one, not very

good reasoning. Two, the judge didn’t hold that. The

judge simply held that, as an in-house expert -- the

attorneys claimed that the information was gathered in

anticipation of litigation. They just didn’t meet that

burden. Therefore, the Rule didn’t apply, and he was not

in anticipation of litigation.

The other District Court decision, the Topsy

(phonetic ) v. Sifer (phonetic) International or whatever it

is that was referred to in the Kansas case and the case

that was in our brief, the Marine Patroli (phonetic) v.

Champlin (phonetic), which is a DC circuit Court opinion in

1980, is not only much more persuasive that in-house

experts have be allowed this protection.

Your Honor, there’s a very logical reason for it,

and it’s holding the cost down. A company often times has

the most expertise in its given area of anybody, of any

outside consultants they could hire. The South Florida

Water Management District has certain scientists that are

obviously every expert in their field, and do does the

United States, sometimes more the expert that anybody you

go hire from the outside.

To ever hold that in-house experts cannot ever

 


35

 

qualify for the 26(b)(4) protections automatically means

that these people are useless in litigation, because

everything they write down, every conversation that they

have, is discoverable, regardless of whether it’s work

product, regardless of whether it goes directly to the

attorney’s trial strategy in preparing his case.

We do not deny that Dan Shite can be deposed now

or that Mike Finley or that Colonel Herndon, former head of

the Corps -- and Finley, former Superintendent of the

Park -- could be deposed right now. They are parties, your

Honor. They have a right to depose them on stuff that

didn’t involve the litigation. But, clearly those people

have also been involved in the strategy sessions of this

litigation, especially Finley and Shite.

And my point is this. Besides the 26(b)(4)

protections that I think they deserve for the time frame

once they became advisers to the United States in this

case, it’s the timing. Why should we let them depose Mr.

Shite now over stuff that he did prior the litigation.

only to come back and hit him with a second deposition once

they get the documents? It makes a lot more sense to

simply finish the first round of documents. We’ll open

these depositions up. They can go through his fact witness

type stuff as to all of the stuff he did before the

anticipation of litigation. They can go to any reports

 


36

 

that he may generate for us.

We honestly have not decided to use Mr. Shite as

a witness. We will not throw that 26(b)(4)(b) consultant

thing in their face. We’re going to give them Dan Shite,

but we are going to object to work product questions. He

is our litigation adviser, and his notes of our meetings,

etcetera -- which the guy is a prolific writer. He takes

notes at virtually every meeting we have. We’re going to

object to that stuff, and we think we have a right to. We

think he does have those protections.

Colonel Herndon, no question. We probably won’t

ever use Colonel Herndon as a witness. He has signed an

affidavit in this case. We're not going to stop them from

deposing Colonel Herndon.

Again, the issue is timing. They have not even

requested sessions to go to the Corps of Engineers. We’ve

talked a lot about it. We --

THE COURT: Then what’s your concern there? If

they’re ready for his deposition without those documents,

what’s your concern? That it would result in a second

deposition?

MR. HARRISON: Of course. There is no question.

There’s fourteen file cabinets full of documents up there.

Colonel Herndon is an extremely important man.

He serves in the Pentagon now. He was the former District

 


37

 

Engineer here.

It simply doesn’t make sense to begin this

precedent of happening in this case. If you begin it once,

it’s going to escalate into arguments that they have a

right to continue to go to depositions before they’ve even

attempted to narrow the scope of the deposition or even

attempted to review documents which really will be relevant

to that deposition.

If your Honor down fell that they should be able

to depose these witnesses now, especially Herndon because

they haven’t looked at his documents, we would certainly

request an order that -- it was their risk. It was their

decision -- they have waived any opportunity to depose

Colonel Herndon a second time.

If we start down this road, you’re going to have

every one of these public employees -- they even threatened

to depose the Secretary of Interior, your Honor. We can’t

allow these depositions to what we believe degenerate into

what is truly geared for harassment.

Your Honor, there was a reason we think that they

wanted Herndon so badly at that time, and it was obviously

in support of their Rule 19 argument. They were trying to

get the court to join the Corps of Engineers as a named

defendant. They lost that motion. I think the heat went

off of it for awhile. They do want Colonel Herndon. We

 


38

 

are prepared to give them Colonel Herndon, but we believe

that either they’ll agree to do it only once or that they

should go to Jacksonville and at least make an effort to

review the documents and than take Herndon for everything

that he’s worth and be done with him.

We think that all of these public servants have

got be deposed just one time or this case is going to

raise in costs -- escalate in costs, and the Lord knows

it’s already cost the taxpayers a lot of money. Okay. All

right. That is our -- the fourth point.

I think that another critical point on these

depositions is that, once they begin -- all parties now are

essentially fixed in this courtroom. Sugar is on appeal to

the Eleventh Circuit, but their lawyers are sitting here in

this courtroom -- Bill, Earl, Tom -- the law firm. I

don’t think that they will be prejudiced. Any documents

they get and any depositions they take are going to be

sitting in the same law office. If the Eleventh Circuit

reverses and lets them in, there’s -- they’ve suffered no

prejudice.

In fact, Sugar right now is under a State public

records request. They’ve gotten about double the documents

that we’ve gotten, and they’re -- the District is

continuing to produce all of the scientific documents that

we still have yet to see. So -- which makes us a little

 


39

 

uneasy, because those are also obviously benefiting the

cities of Belle Glade and Clewiston indirectly; and we

believe that that’s another compelling reason to get us up

to the District to see the rest of those documents.

They’re even on their second round of production and

getting updates.

But, back to the depositions, the depositions

have got to bind all parties. I have a suggestion. It’s a

little unusual. We would like the court to consider it.

The plaintiff -- if we want to notice a deposition of the

defendant or the defendant intervenors, we will take it

upon ourselves to work out an agreement with our plaintiff

intervenors first as to a date, and then we will try to

work a date and notice the depositions for the defendants.

We’re willing to do that. Whether the court has

the power to order it, we’re certainly willing to encourage

that to try to schedule these things -- the scheduling may

become a nightmare -- if the defendants will agree to the

same thing, to where they will at least make a good-faith

effort to coordinate the defendant intervenors, notice us,

and work out the dates. Hopefully that’s going to prevent

us from continually coming back to this court.

THE COURT: What’s the status right now with the

intervenors and with the motion to dismiss? Has that been

decided --


uparrow.gif (122 bytes)                                                                                                                                   40

 

      MR. HARRISON: Yes, your Honor, the motion to

dismiss has been decided. All five counts have been upheld

by Judge Hoeveler. We are now in a lawsuit on all five

counts. There --

THE COURT: With all parties in the suit?

MR. HARRISON: All parties -- what we have now is

the United States, of course, as the plaintiff. We do have

all of the plaintiff intervenors that came in by

stipulation. The defendants, of course, are DER and the

Water Management District. The defendant intervenors that

have been allowed to intervene are the Cities of Belle

Glade and Clewiston. The United States did file a motion

to limit that intervention. We didn’t want them litigating

under the name of Belle Glade for all of the economic

reasons that the agricultural interests might want to

litigate. They represented to the court that their primary

interests were water supply and flood control as it affects

the cities. Judge Hoeveler granted our motion for

intervention.

I will give them this. The wording is a little

oblique. In the order it says that he’s letting them in

for all issues, but in earlier -- if you read both of the

orders allowing the interventions of the Cities of Belle

Glade and Clewiston, I think that you can only read them in

that he granted our motion to limit. If they’re in for all

 


41

 

issues, period, and not simply water supply and flood

control as it affects the cities, then we didn’t win that

motion.

THE COURT: What’s you concern then about

depositions as far as binding all parties, if they’re

now --

MR. HARRISON: It’s the timing, Judge. It’s

just -- it’s primarily just preventing duplicate

depositions. That is -- that is going to happen in this

case. We’re going to notice the deposition. Someone else

isn’t going to be able to be there, and they’re going to

try to notice the deposition later.

There has to be a procure where there’s

good-faith efforts to schedule the depositions. And the

Manual on Complex Litigation, which some of that is

referred to in the second report of joint scheduling

conference that we’ve filed, has suggestions about no

simultaneous depositions in different cities. In fact, we

don’t want simultaneous depositions anywhere.

It’s simply scheduling it so that everybody gets

an opportunity to be at the deposition, so you don’t have

constant objections that, "We didn’t get our chance. Now

we want to depose them." And the people that are going to

suffer aren’t the lawyers nearly so much as the deponents.

THE COURT: Well, it doesn’t seem to me that

 


42

 

there’s -- I’ll hear what the defendants have to say about

this. But it doesn’t seem to me that there are that many

parties, that many lawyers, and that many persons involved

here that -- or as far as lawyers are concerned, that a

date could not be worked out for a deposition that all

parties could attend; and therefore, their clients are

bound -- or all lawyers; and therefore, their clients are

bound by those depositions.

MR. HARRISON: I do agree. We expect that at any

of the important depositions there will probably be about

eight attorneys, and what we think is probably-- this is

just our speculation, but Der one, the District two, we’ll

have two, Belle Glade and Clewiston will probably have one

attorney; and so, we think that there would be mostly a

maximum of eight attorneys.

I don’t think the scheduling is going to be that

critical, but it is going to be a problem , and we don’t

want any whipsawing either. We’re guaranteeing that we’re

not going to let the plaintiff intervenors -- or we’re

going to work to keep the plaintiff intervenors and

ourselves from trying to whipsaw deponents into noticing

depositions for different simultaneous dates.

THE COURT: Well, all parties are aware, of

course, of the notice requirements for depositions. I, in

resolving discovery matters or basically discovery matters

 


43

 

in large -- in the see complex suits, a lot of times find

unnecessary motions for a protective order, disruptions of

schedules, costs to clients and so forth in terms of travel

plans, which I think are unnecessary.

I think that -- and I don’t want to be involved.

I see here a provision for telephone conferences to me. I

don’t want to be on the telephone any more than necessary.

First of all, I have no objection to resolving discovery

disputes by telephone. In fact, I do that routinely in

many cases. But, I don’t think it’s necessary -- and I

just make this as a general statement -- to be involved in

the scheduling of depositions because one lawyer can’t be

there --

MR. HARRISON: All right.

THE COURT: -- or because it’s been noticed on

too short -- that the notice has been insufficient.

Those things, I think should be able to be worked

out. I will be surprised and not pleased to have to

resolve when a deposition should take place; or then this

subsequent problem that you’re indicating may occur, and

that is that someone doesn’t show up and , therefore, wants

to take a second deposition. The would be highly unusual

in my opinion.

MR. HARRISON: Yeah, this case is highly unusual,

and I guess we’re a little gun shy. We’re trying to

 


44

 

and head off problems, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HARRISON: And that’s primarily where we’re

heading. I think the Manual on Complex Litigation suggests

some odd fifteen days notice for depositions. We would --

we believe that there is -- that there should be some

requirements that there is a somewhat longer than the

five-day normal -- five-- or ten--day notice.

THE COURT: Well, whatever. Whatever. I think

that is the best way , in my experience both as a judge and an

attorney, is that these kinds of things can be worked

out -- secretaries send most of the time doing this --

but, that they can be worked out by agreement. I don’t --

MR. HARRISON: Judge, I’ve been practicing for

thirteen years and have never had any trouble doing it.

We’re a little nervous in this case.

THE COURT: All right. Well, then let’s not

necessarily anticipate that problem until it arises here.

All right. Anything else about the --

MR. HARRISON: Okay. Other that , your

Honor, the binding, we have provided in paragraphs 6

through 8 other dates for revealing expert witness in the

event interrogatories have not been propounded. We think

that --

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you. I think one of

 


45

 

the objections -- and I won’t speak for them -- but, I

think one of the objections that the defendants are making

is the requirement for interrogatories prior to the

beginning of depositions; and it seems to me, again based

on my own experience in litigating here, that a reasonable

response -- and I do mean a reasonable response -- to

interrogatories requesting names of witness, if they --

depending on how that’s worded -- but, a reasonable

response is undetermined at this time; and it’s also the

most useless response --

MR. HARRISON: Yes. Your Honor, the only thing

that I guess I would add to that, however, is that I

completely agree with their brief. Interrogatories are no

a good vehicle for discovery of the facts and opinions of a

witness. They’re not sufficient at all to go to trial on

and to prepare for cross examination.

That’s not at all what we want. What we’re

saying is that, if there is not some method, be it

interrogatories or agreed upon dates, where you have to

reveal any witnesses that you know as witnesses at the

time, and if later it becomes that we can prove or they can

prove that we were sandbagging and that we did have

somebody tagged as a witness gut we didn’t name them, then

there is a sanction for that, and you can bar use of that

witness at trial. That’s what keeps lawyers truthful and

 


46

 

honest.

And with all due respect, the problem is, if we

do not list witnesses somehow, then we’re looking at abut

a hundred and fifty material scientists at that district.

We don’t know who to begin depositions of. We’re going to

have to start deposing anybody that’s done scientific work

in the area that’s important. Their schedule proposes not

to reveal the identity of any witness until three months

before trial.

THE COURT: Well, I recognize the problem with

that, too, but I’m just envisioning here a problem with

interrogatories. If the interrogatories list all of these

persons that you presently expect to be calling as

witnesses at trial and -- that’s not so bad, it doesn’t

seem to me --

MR. HARRISON: That’s the only real thing that --

THE COURT: -- and this can be given. But, then,

if it goes on beyond -- in the normal further requests,

there are what are their positions, what are their

addresses, and so forth; and that’s easy enough. But, if

it gets into what is the substance of their testimony, what

are the -- and as to experts what is the factual basis for

the opinions that -- what are the opinions and the factual

basis, this seems to me to be a bit premature for answering

some of those questions at this stage of the litigation --

 


47

 

MR. HARRISON: Your Honor, I tend to agree.

They’re certainly not going to have the substance

well-formed, but, for example, they will know that -- let’s

say that George Marban (phonetic) is their hydrology expert

and that the substance of his testimony or category of his

testimony is going to be the hydrology and the hydrologic

modeling of the system. That’s really all we expect at

that point in time.

We realize that through interrogatories is not

going to be the discovery vehicle, but what is important is

that both sides aren’t required to begin guessing who the

witnesses are going to be, so they start noticing virtually

every scientist at the Corps and at the Park. We think

that it an gravely eliminate -- when this thing gets

closer to trial, regardless of whether we might like to

depose all of their scientists, we’re going to be forced to

home in on witnesses. If we don’t know who those witnesses

are, we’re guessing; and if we only learn the identity

three months prior to trial, we may have missed some, and

you’re in you trial preparation final phase.

THE COURT: Well, I understand that concern, but

I don’t want this to bog down into motions to compel better

answers to interrogatories either.

MR. HARRISON: No, and I wholeheartedly agree.

And that’s why I have said that, one I am going to stand

 


48

 

here right now and waive any of our experts in our case in

chief once they propound interrogatories to ask us to

reveal the identity of the witness and a basic little

summary of the area that which he is going to testify.

The Rules technically require, if they then want

the report or a deposition of the witness, they have to go

through the 24(b) -- 26(b)(4)(a)(ii) motion for further

discovery. Never in my life have I required that, and we

don’t intend to do it here. Right now I will stand here

and waive that for the experts that we call in chief. I

won’t agree to that in advance for rebuttal experts or for

perhaps expert consultants, but for experts that we will

identify all they have to do is propound an interrogatory

that says who they are, we’ll give them a brief summary,

and then they get a deposition. The deposition is the

discovery vehicle for answers.

We don’t want to impede discovery at all, but

without knowing who to depose, Judge, that’s going to

impede discovery, because you’re going to be deposing

people you don’t need to depose. You’re not going to know

in what capacity the witness is when you go in to depose

him -- is he a fact witness, an expert witness -- or if you

noticed a consultant that they really don’t want to turn

over. These things have to be ironed out.

The Rules were passed for a reason. That

 


49

 

expedites discovery to simply find out who the witness is,

what his capacity is gong to be, and one lousy paragraph

as to what he’s going to testify to. That’s all we really

want on interrogatories.

THE COURT: And I also see that on your proposal,

on the proposed pretrial discovery schedule, the latest

here, that you make a provision in there for further dates

for identifying additional experts --

MR. HARISON: Yes.

THE COURT: -- as late a December of 1990 as

revised --

MR. HARISON: The reason we did that, your

Honor -- I know there is a continuing duty under

interrogatories -- (unintelligible) interrogatory duties,

but lawyers get busy, and we realize that, and we also know

that Mr. Rogers -- Pete Johnson for the defendant -- seems

to detest interrogatories. They may choose not to send

interrogatories. If that is true, then we will be bound by

certain dates to reveal experts that we have at that time.

If they choose not to send interrogatories, they have a

vehicle to find out the identity of witnesses. That’s the

whole reason for all of that -- is to find out witnesses,

so we can begin depositions in a logical manner.

THE COURT: Both fact and expert witnesses?

MR. HARRISON: Yes, your Honor, I think that it

 


50

 

should be fact and expert witnesses. As an attorney going

into a deposition, you need to know that to even know what

kind of questions you’re going to be asking -- opinion

questions --

THE COURT: But, it may also be that witnesses

may be identified as experts either early on or later ---

MR. HARRISON: Exactly.

THE COURT: -- and that you may wish -- for

example, a -- either side may identify someone as a fact

witness who then subsequently becomes an expert witness for

one reason or another. That then --

MR. HARRISON: If that happens, then there would

be good cause, your Honor, for being -- to re-depose and go

to opinion questioning.

THE COURT: Because I can see that the

interrogatories you anticipate, although it doesn’t say

here, would be list those fact witness and list those

expert witnesses; and it may not be possible to know that

at this time.

MR. HARRISON: No, and it’s not, but in a case

like this, where we’re wanting to get to trial in about a

year, we have to start now. We can’t wait six months down

the line to discern that information. Even if they can

just tell us four or five now and we tell them four or five

now, we can begin now.

 


51

 

THE COURT: I agree with that, but I think I’m

leaning at this time to not -- well, I’m not quite sure

that I see the reason, although July -- you know, how

quickly these dates turn over -- but, that depositions

couldn’t begin before July. I know the defendants want to

depose at least three identified persons at this time --

MR. HARRISON: Yes.

THE COURT: -- and I believe they’re ready to do

so and, I think, also would state, although I’m kind of

speaking for them, that they’re not anticipating needing

these documents or else they’re certainly not anticipating

having to reschedule or continue or to set a second session

for those individuals based on those documents.

MR. HARRISON: Your Honor, in on degree you’re

correct, in that they have now received the Loxahatchee and

the Park documents. From that standpoint I assume that

they’re reviewing those documents, but they at least have

the documents. They have met most of our objections for

deposing Dan Shite and Mike Finley. I would ask that, if

they do that and they haven’t truly reviewed the

documents -- it’s up to them, but if they do that, they’ve

got them. They had their bite at the apple, and they can

depose them.

There is one other consideration, though, your

Honor. There really aren’t that many lawyers on this case

 


52

 

on either side. I mean they say we have ten, but I think

your Honor knows the way it works. You’re looking the

litigators in this room.

We’re going to be spread pretty thin when

depositions start. If depositions begin while document

sessions are still going on -- well, at least while this

first one -- and we don’t anticipate any major second

request for documents. But, if we could finish that

document session by July -- or event he can escalate that,

if there’s any way to escalate that -- then the lawyers are

freed up from the main burden of sitting up there and going

through file cabinets; and then we should be able to take

more depositions closer together that if we’re spread

between documents production sessions and depositions.

There is an internal logic in finishing this first round.

THE COURT: How much remains to be done on that

first round? And I know --

MR. HARRISON: Judge, we have, according to their

estimates, two-thirds of our documents to look at, about

two -- about three hundred and fifty thousand documents

that we have to examine to decide which ones we want to

tag. We estimate that that’s approximately two weeks.

This is also their estimate. Now, that estimate was before

a two-day session in October, so technically, according to

their estimate -- and it fits ours -- there’s about ten

 


53

 

days that we have to spend looking at documents; and we

use --

THE COURT: Do you mean documents that have been

produced that you haven’t looked at yet or documents that

have not yet been produced?

MR. HARRISON: Yes, these are -- there are three

hundred and fifty thousand, according to their estimate,

that we have never even seen. Now, the procedure of what

we do is we sit there and we go through them as rapidly as

we can, and the ones that we want them to copy for us we

bait-stamp, and we keep an order and an index; and at the

same time, we’re trying to -- devise we’re trying to put

those into a computer litigation system. It’s very

time-consuming.

They have looked at the Refuge documents and at

the Park documents. They have not been to the Corps of

Engineers yet. We’ve offered different sessions, two in

December, one in January, and two different in March. We

discussed it in March, and we're hoping that all of this

can be done by July 1.

As far as I understand, there’s about fourteen

file cabinets up in Jacksonville at the Corps’ headquarters

that they have yet to even look at. Once they look at

those, of course, they’ll be tagging some for reproduction.

And I think that somehow inadvertently about

 


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forty documents at the Park were overlooked, either by the

copier or they weren’t sent to the copier. We found out

the other day that was some of the source of those forty

documents. We are now looking for those files. A

wholesale file was apparently overlooked; and once we find

that, you’ll be getting those.

But, really what it amounts to is they’ve got

about fourteen file cabinets yet to look at under the first

request; and we’ve got roughly three hundred and fifty

thousand documents, give or take a few thousand, to look

at. So, there is quite a chore left.

And -- I mean I -- this isn’t my only case. I’ve

got five trials in the next two months -- three months, and

Ms. -- as a practical matter, Judge, we’re spread pretty

thin. If we start depositions before we have a chance to

finish these documents, I think it’s going to be pretty

rough to do much of a job on that, but --

THE COURT: All right. Well, let’s leave that

for a moment.

MR. HARRISON : Okay.

THE COURT: You next then have two other

procedural --

MR. HARRISON: Yes, and that’s -- we’ve, I think,

exhausted the schedule, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, the schedule and also probably

 


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what you’ve mentioned as to completing depositions

before -- or interrogatories before depositions.

MR. HARRISON: I would simply like to direct your

attention to -- I mean it’s their schedule, and we’ve beat

it to death, but there’s no way that you can wait until

three months prior to a trial like this to identify

witnesses. We anticipate there will be at least thirty

witnesses on the stand at trial. There’s no way -- their

discovery cutoff, Judge, isn’t until one month before

trial. That’s not realistic.

We’re going to at least have -- there could be

pretrial motions. There’s going to be joint stipulations.

There’s going to be -- we have to prepare witnesses. We

owe that to our client, and we owe that to Everglades

National Park. We’ve got to have some time to prepare this

case properly.

Their schedule is going to lead -- we’re going to

be in discovery wars. We’re going to be arguing about the

scope of depositions, etcetera, right up to the time of

trial. It’s a total freewheeling schedule, and I would

simply commend it -- and I’m sure you’ve read it, but if

you have any questions, just simply put it beside ours and

see which is the more logical schedule from a litigator’s

standpoint -- which one is truly geared to not allowing, I

guess, the truth to be obscured by fighting and infighting

 


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right up to the brink of trial. We simply can’t afford

that at this point.

THE COURT: All right. What’s the -- in a

nut shell, what is your position as to -- perhaps I’ve

already read it -- or I think I have -- but, that the

discovery must be District-wide? Is there still a dispute

about that?

MR. HARRISON: Well, I think formally there’s

still a dispute about it, your Honor. For example, the

Loxahatchee -- the lease and the MOA documents -- they say

only the legal -- what we did was, when we propounded that

request for production initially, they had given us a

walk-through tour, and we did put it in categories. We

did. I mean we would label the Environmental Science

Division and put what documents we felt were in that

division. The Water Quality Division -- list what

documents we felt were in that division. But, we did make

it extremely clear in that document that we expect them to

be bound District-wide.

Judge, we didn’t sue the divisions; we sued the

Water Management District. And if they choose -- and they

did and we’ve agreed -- to produce documents as they are

kept in the usual course of business, you can’t expect the

United States to glean which file cabinet the document is

in or even in which division.

 


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The fairness is, your Honor, that we have agreed

that the entire United States Government, all of the --

there are three main agencies that they’re looking at,

which have many more divisions than they do. We’re going

to be bound United States-wide. If they have asked for a

document, if that -- if we have a responsive document in

Jacksonville, in Boca, wherever it is, we’re obligated to

provide it.

Judge, they didn’t even circulate our request for

production amongst all of the divisions. What we did was

take our request for -- their request for production of

documents, sent that to Jacksonville, and said, "Make sure

all of you divisions get it. If you have any responsive

documents start tagging them and getting them in boxes."

We did the same thing with the Park. All of the Park

scientists got to look at it. At least that was our

instructions to our clients, and we believe in good faith

that’s what they have done, and we agree to be bound by

that.

THE COURT: Well, I think part of their concern

is -- here is that -- I’m not sure how many divisions there

are. I think sixteen or eighteen or something like that.

MR. HARRISON: I think they have actually some

odd forty divisions, I believe.

MR. JACKSON: Well, your Honor, we have about a

 


58

 

dozen departments, and each department has between one and,

say, half a dozen divisions.

THE COURT: Some of these documents may be

each -- the same document that may be responsive to your

request may be in each of these departments or divisions or

whatever they’re called; and I think one of the reasons --

or one of the concerns that the defendants have here is the

man-hours required to have each division or department look

for the same document and then produce that same document,

if it’s already being produced in a division which they

would contend I believe --

MR. HARRISON: Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- is the most relevant to this

lawsuit and that being south of Okeechobee.

MR. HARRISON: It may well be, and we suffer with

the same problem. I mean there’s obviously numerous

scientists at Everglades National Park that may all have

copies of a dosing study report, but the risk of providing

a couple of extra duplicates -- we have put our people to

that burden. They have, at least twice in the last couple

of years -- and it has nothing to do with hiding things in

this lawsuit -- but, they have been realigning divisions.

There’s no way for the United States to be able

to glean that we want only these documents out of the

Environmental Sciences Division, these documents out of the

 


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Water Quality Division, these out of the Executive

Division, and these out of the whatever Division. We have

no way of knowing that; and that is an unreasonable burden

that makes it very easy, whether intentionally or

inadvertently, to miss documents.

They don’t have near the amount of divisions in

that building in West Palm Beach as the three United States

Government agencies have nationwide. We’ve got the

Department of Interior if they have any documents in

Washington. We have the US Fish & Wildlife Service, the

Loxahatchee Refuge in Palm Beach . We’ve got the Everglades

National Park which is a huge center down in Homestead.

We have the Corps of Engineers in Jacksonville. We have

their field offices in Miami. The Corps has probably as

many divisions as they do, and we have gone to that burden.

There may be some duplication, your Honor. We

have seen duplication, and I’m certain so have the

defendants, but you can’t expect us to be able to predict

in what file cabinet and in what division a category of

document is in. It’s very difficult to discern between

Environmental Sciences and Water Quality.

They’re the experts. They have a computerized

tracking system. They have their own indexes of where

their documents are. They should be able to make some

intelligent decisions as to where those documents are. We


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can’t be expected to do that. We’re outsiders.

THE COURT: All right. I’ll hear their response

about that in a moment --

MR. HARRISON: Okay. It’s--

THE COURT: -- but I did recognize those

concerns.

MR. HARRISON: Okay. We-- it is very important.

THE COURT: And then also, just to speed this up

somewhat, a third procedural matter which I think they

are-- have a-- perhaps would have a problem with or a

response to is the one where you say, "Lawyers should

produce documents, not witnesses." And wouldn’t that occur

if all documents are required to be produced prior to-- it

seems a problem-- and again based on my own experience--

that, if a party through its attorneys, in this case the

United States in the broadest sense and here the District,

produces documents in response to a document request and

then a witness, an individual witness, gets a notice of

deposition with a duces tecum that requires many of these

same documents, that’s a lot of work and --

MR. HARRISON: I agree, and we think it's -- it’s

very easily solved. When you notice a subpoena duces

tecum, you simply put language in it, "Except for documents

previously produced." The depositions that we -- that Dan

Shite and Mike Finley received -- and Colonel Herndon --

 


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did not have that, and there's no point in requiring us to

come forward to the court and make that objection. It's

just a waste of time.

If we have produced that document, if it's in

their files and that document is relevant to the subpoena

duces tecum, if they simply put that language in their

notice -- and we will, too -- then the witness doesn't have

to bring it. Obviously there's things like his curriculum

vitae. There may be new things that have been generated

since the request for production. So, you're going to have

to bring those, and they have a right to those at the

deposition. But, you can't put the burden on the witness

to bring a whole bunch of documents that they already have.

That's the whole gravamen of that.

THE COURT: It seems like this is a problem that

might work both ways. I know that there are situations

where documents can be produced en masse by a party, and

then for any particular witness the party may be -- the

lawyer may be in a difficult position to know which of

those documents are even relevant to certain areas of

inquiry. But, it seems to me that that works both ways and

on both sides, but --

MR. HARRISON: It does, your Honor, but I just

think that, in a case where all of these deponents are

sitting there doing public jobs-- they're not-- they're

 


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doing very important public jobs. They're public servants.

They're supported by the taxpayers -- we lawyers should

have some obligation to screen our documents, make

intelligent decisions to focus these depositions as to what

areas we want to depose on screen our -- in other words,

they have the computer litigation system, and we are

devising one.

If you want to depose Fred Davis at the District,

you punch in all of the Fred Davis documents, all documents

to Fred Davis, all documents authored by Fred Davis, all

documents regarding his special interests, whether it be

parafytin (phonetic), algae, or whatever.

There has to be some burden on the United -- or

on the attorneys to simply not say, "Okay. We're just

going to -- anything that's relevant that you've ever had

anything to do with, you bring it in."

THE COURT: But, then are you -- I'm not quite

sure here what your request would be.

MR. HARRISON: Okay.

THE COURT: Would your request be that, once this

first round of document production is completed, that there

would not be any subpoena duces tecums to these witnesses

at all?

MR. HARRISON: No, your Honor. You could

certainly put a subpoena duces tecum with all of the

 


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relevant questions you think apply to that witness, but if

you put the catchall In there. "Except for documents

previously furnished," you know," "pursuant to the request

for production," then that relieves the burden on the

deponent. I mean he's going to be consulting with his

attorneys; and we'll be looking at our list as to what has

been provided, obviously, so he won't have to gather it.

But, that means that, if the witness has done any

reports or has generated something or if you think of a

category that you didn't think of in your request for

production that is relevant, you have a right to ask that

on a duces tecum. But, if it's the identical category that

you've already asked for in your request for production and

you've got that document in your files someplace, you

shouldn't put the burden on the deponent to bring those

documents again.

It's fair game to ask new categories. You --as

the case moves along, we all think of new categories that

perhaps we forgot to request; and in that event, I don't

think you're bound to serve another documents request. You

can do it through the subpoena duces tecum.

But, the simple catchall, "Except for documents

previously provided." I think will solve that problem.

THE COURT: And I take it that this problem came

up in the deposition subpoena or the --

 

 


64

MR. HARRISON: It did, not as much, as Herndon

was a very narrow deposition. I think that they -- the

problem with Colonel Herndon's subpoena is that they simply

hadn't looked at the documents. We are going to provide

the documents pursuant to the requests that are in that

subpoena duces tecum when they get up there and look at

those fourteen file cabinets or if your Honor orders that

prior to their review of the documents.

But, it did also with Mike Finley, the former

Superintendent of the Park, and Dan Shite. Many of the

documents they had requested in the subpoena duces tecum

were, in fact, covered by the request; and I think with

Finley and Shite they even admitted it in a footnote; and

I -- the Lord knows it's in there. That's my belief.

But, if the documents have previously been

provided -- and I think some of those were -- the witness

shouldn't have to bring them again. That's all we're

saying. And if they think of new areas that they hadn't

requested in the request for production, it's fair game.

Put it in the duces tecum.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HARRISON: It's just trying to eliminate the

burden on some of these agencies and keep them on the job

instead of sitting in a deposition room.

Documents request is the other one. We -- I

 


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think the pretrial schedule will solve that -- that we do

get the first round complete by July 1. We'd like to

complete it before that, but, your Honor, I don't know that

there's any legitimate way for us to review that many

documents and get it done before July 1st.

And I know Agriculture is currently -- has a

scheduled session -- I believe they do -- at the Corps of

Engineers, and apparently it's a very massive session, and

I'm not sure if they can accommodate both at this time. We

don't -- we will certainly try to get the Corps to

accommodate them if that's your Honor's wishes, but I think

realistically it's going to be July 1st before we can

really have a chance to complete that first round.

Your Honor, if I just may briefly address the

teleconference, and then I'll sit down.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HARRISON: A teleconference is unusual.

Judge Smargon provided for it in its order. It is also

provided for in the Manual for Complex Litigation. I think

that it serves -- first off, it clearly puts a burden on

you, if you agree to that, that is somewhat above and

beyond the call of duty.

This case is somewhat above and beyond thy call.

The case is very important. We honestly feel in our own

heart this lawsuit may well be one of the last

 


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opportunities to provide water quality protection for

Everglades National Park, a problem that's been exasperated

for the last eighteen years. It's an important case. It

has to move forward, but it has to move forward in an

orderly manner.

We're interested in keeping our costs down.

We're interested in keeping the hours that we have to work

on this down as much as possible. The District has already

spent approximately $2 million in legal fees. They have to

be interested in keeping those costs down. These are

taxpayers' dollars that are being spent.

If we can somehow prevent full briefing schedules

on every discovery dispute, it's going to benefit everyone,

That's one main benefit of the teleconference. The other

benefit is that, although your Honor has no real power to

prevent the parties from going to full briefing schedules,

what I think you do have the power to do in say, "If a

discovery dispute arises, before you go to briefing

schedules, at the request of either party, you must call me

and inform me of the dispute."

We could decide at the beginning of that

conversation whether we agree to be bound by this

teleconference. If we do, fine, we go and make our

arguments and we get an order, and we save all of the time

and expense of these briefing wars. If we don't, honestly,

 


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then your Honor probably has no business hearing the

argument, and you can't render advisory opinions. You

could simply encourage the parties to attempt to settle it,

and we'd get off the phone and go to full briefing

schedules.

But, your Honor, the fact that we have to call

you and inform you of a dispute and see if we can agree to

be bound by it does one, I think. important thing. It puts

somewhat of a chilling effect. If a party, in the spirit

of litigation or in the spirit of discovery, starts taking

a position he thinks is justified, and then he's confronted

with defending that position in front of a court, even on

the telephone, it puts somewhat of a chilling effect if all

of a sudden you begin thinking. "Maybe I'm in -- maybe I'm

not in good faith. Maybe I should try to agree," rather

than -- it's very easy to go back to your office and start

writing briefs.

Only one time did we challenge the other side to

go to a telephone conference, and that was after Judge

Smargon encouraged it in his order. This was in the first

briefing session when they brought in boxes that were

totally disorganized. This is part of the things that we

have worked out by agreement now that are no longer at

least in dispute -- the manner of production. They not

only refused; they wouldn't even give us a reason.

 


68

 

We called the magistrate and we said, "Are you

available for a conference, an actual hearing, if you don't

want to do this over the telephone?" He was. He gave us

time for an emergency hearing that afternoon. The

defendants refused to attend it, didn't give us any reason,

went to a full briefing schedule; and from that point on,

this discovery war has escalated; and that was in the very

first round of production.

THE COURT: It sounds like a reason not to allow

telephone conferences, but maybe not. I'm being -- let me

tell you two--

MR. HARRISON: It's not going to be easy for your

Honor. We would ask that you consider it, and we think

that it'll --

THE COURT: Let me tell you two of my thoughts on

that, and it might assist the defendants a little bit.

First of all, obviously it doesn't do any good to have a

telephone conference with the court if the parties are not

agreeing to be bound by whatever -- I have enough problems

with parties agreeing to be bound by orders that we have

after full hearings.

MR. HARRISON: I know that.

THE COURT: But, obviously it wouldn't do enough

good to have -- or to simply have a telephone conference

that would not result in some kind of a binding court

 


69

 

decision.

But, the second part and perhaps more significant

is that telephone conferences sometimes can -- well, to put

it another way, if telephone conferences are not allowed,

then the parties sometimes either resolve it on their own

or decide that it's not that serious of a dispute and

discovery will continue. Now, I don't know the dynamics

involved in this case, although what I'm hearing and at

least initially reading is that there have been some

disputes which have not been able to be worked out.

But, it would not be my intention to referee a

particular deposition, for example; and I have been asked

to do that; and -- "Judge, we've asked this question. He's

objected and refused not to -- and instructed his client

not to answer." I don't want to be involved and don't

think I can be involved as a referee at every step of the

litigation to that level.

MR. HARRISON: No. Right. We realize that.

THE COURT: And I don't think you're suggesting

telephone conferences for those kinds of things, but

rather--

MR. HARRISON: No.

THE COURT: What kinds of things are you

envisioning--

MR. HARRISON: No. If, for example, there is a

 


70

discovery dispute over, for instance, the timing of a

deposition and all of this, a notice or the right to take a

second deposition, things that perhaps can be worked out or

that should be worked out by the parties but that for some

reason are not.

Your Honor, we don't believe -- it's the old

adage, "The plaintiff has to get to trial. The defendant

really never wants to get to that court." I mean we

believe that's very important in this case, and I don't

mean to be (unintelligible), but that's just the way the

system is. It's the plaintiff's case. The longer the

defendant can keep us at bay or keep away from trial, it

benefits the defendant; it doesn't benefit the plaintiff.

On the other hand, the case is so important we

cannot get to trial in six months. We can't do it. We'd

be guilty of malpractice if we did that.

But, Judge, we don't believe that there is as

much impetus, if you will, on the part of the defendants in

a case such as this to agree; and it may-- in the spirit

of litigation it may lead -- and we think that it has in

the last year led to certain refusals to cooperate that

were not in good faith. At least when we were offering

them three schedules, they could have at least talked to us

about them and proposed some counter-offers. They haven't

even done that.

 


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That would be things like that that we think

that, if they are -- if we believe they're acting in bad

faith, we're going to call. We would like to get a hearing

on it. But, if you require the full month of briefing

schedules on virtually everything -- we've already seen

what it's led to now. There's virtually thousands and

thousands and thousands of dollars represented here and

thousands of hours of time, which would have been better

spent preparing for trial and going to legitimate discovery

and trying to work things out.

We just think that any time you're acting in bad

faith, whether you realize it or not, if you're confronted

with having to present that case to a lawyer and to a

judge, instead of going back and -- briefs can be

manipulated, Judge. There's case law on all sides of

discovery issues -- no question. But, there's basic

equities in every dispute; and if you can articulate those

equities without going back and having to go through the

full briefing schedule and trying to mask the problem, we

think that it'll simply speed it up and that it will --

THE COURT: Well, I don't see a problem --

MR. HARRISON: --go a long way toward reducing

the costs. We'd ask you to consider it.

THE COURT: I don't really see a problem

hear what the defendants have to say about that, but I

 


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don't see a problem with allowing for telephone conferences

with myself. I see a lot of advantages to that. It could

always -- or it could be my decision if I think that briefs

are necessary; or if a party requests a brief because he--

MR. HARRISON: Certainly.

THE COURT: -- then can just say that I think

that should be briefed. But, I'm inclined to allow for

telephone conferences, assuming that they can be set up

with all -- at least all involved parties and perhaps all

parties. I'm not sure, without knowing what the particular

dispute is--

MR. HARRISON: Yes and no.

THE COURT: -- whether every lawyer would have to

be involved --

MR. HARRISON: I agree.

THE COURT: -- but, also from a logistics

standpoint, to have that conference be set up by someone

other then my secretary --

MR. HARRISON: Yeah.

THE COURT: --because that's a problem with our

phone system.

MR. HARRISON: And of course, you'd have to

report. I know there are logistics. Judge Smargon, for

some reason, felt it was very important and that there was

an ultrahigh duty in this case on the attorneys to

 


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cooperate and to move the case forward and--

THE COURT: Well, I believe that, too, and not

only in this case, but in probably every case that's filed

in Federal court.

MR. HARRISON: I know it.

THE COURT: And unfortunately, I'm finding that

here things have bogged down. This is a 1988 case. I'm

not sure when it was filed in 1988, but it's 1990. I

recognize that some of these matters have not been -- some

of the matters that have been fully briefed have not been

coming to the court's attention, and I believe that one

reason for that is Judge Smargon is no lower here.

I'm here, and we're going to -- these matters

will be addressed in a prompt fashion. All discovery I

believe now is in my court; and you will find that I will

get to these matters quickly, so that one of the concerns

perhaps and perhaps a need for a telephone conference is to

think. "Well, it might be six months before Bandstra. does

something," and that's not going to be the case.

MR. HARRISON: Thank you.

THE COURT: But, in any event, that's my forecast

here.

Anything further, Mr. Harrison, on --

MR. HARRISON: No, your Honor. I don't -- I

probably don't even deserve any rebuttal time after all of

 


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this.

THE COURT: Well, let me hear what --

MR. HARRISON: And unless there's some critical,

I'm through. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Jackson, Mr. Harrison

(inaudible) substantive and procedural problems which you

can choose to respond to, and I suppose that you will. I

recognize that you also have perhaps substantive and

procedural matters that you would like to bring to my

attention and you're free to do so.

MR. JACKSON: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.

I would like -- well, I suppose first to welcome

you to this litigation. It's longstanding and continuing,

and it looks like it will for a long time.

And I'd like to take the opportunity, if I may,

just to spend a couple of minutes to introduce the court to

what the case is about; and I only want to do that, not

because I think it's appropriate for the discovery judge to

be worried about the merits of the case, but it heavily

influences a lot of what we've tried to do in discovery and

the positions we've taken in discovery. And to start

talking about the case requires, I think, to start talking

about South Florida; and I'd like to use this photograph

to -- just for illustrative purposes to illustrate the

different areas that we're talking about.

 


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This area up here at the top in blue is, of

course. Lake Okeechobee. The Keys and Miami is down here.

This checkerboard area right here is what's called the

Everglades Agricultural Area. We all call it the EAA now.

And there are certain farmers and farm organizations and

cities that are either intervening as defendants in this

case -- have been allowed in or are trying to get in.

That's a battle that started in December of 1988,

two months after the case was filed. It's now in Atlanta.

We haven't even finished the briefing on appeal in the

Eleventh Circuit; and that's very critical, because for a

long time during this case we did not want to discuss

scheduling, you know, when the trial date is going to be

and when depositions are going to begin, because we didn't

know who the parties were going to be.

The intervenor defendants we do not consider to

be our allies. We opposed their intervention in the case.

And that is one of the reasons why we have been reluctant

to set in stone a briefing schedule -- excuse me -- a

discovery schedule as early as December of '88, when the

United States first started asking for one.

But, that's the EAA. This oblong area here is

Water Conservation Area 1. We run something called the

Central and South Florida Flood Control Project; and part

of that project is to take these wetlands here starting

 


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with Water Conservation Area 1, 2, and 3, this large one

right here, and store water in those areas. We store water

to get rid of it when areas are flooded, and we store water

to keep it so that we can use it in drought periods -- more

the former then the latter.

And then down here is the National Park. This

large area down here is Everglades National Park and again

come agricultural areas here. This is the East Coast with

Miami down here up through West Palm Beach.

The water tends to move like this. The farmers

draw it out of the Lake, use it for irrigation, and then

pump it into our system; and we pump it into the water

conservation areas. This No. 1 up here, by the way, is

also Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge, one of the two

Federal areas we lease to them. It's one of the two

Federal areas that they claim is being damaged by polluted

water. The water is actually pumped around the Refuge in

canals, and then it's allowed to go in the sheet flow

across these water conservation areas until eventually it

reaches the Park.

Now, the Government in this case has alleged that

certain farming practices that occur in the EAA cause these

waters to become polluted with nutrients. The nutrients

move into the Everglades Water Conservation Area. And we

need to be careful when we're talking about Everglades.

 


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because a lot of people, including the District, consider

these wetlands here, which are not a part of the Park, to

be part of the historic Everglades. And the Government is

saying that we're pumping this water into the Refuge and

into the Park and that it has or will cause adverse

environmental effects because of these nutrients that are

in the water.

They've sued us by saying that we have failed to

regulate the EAA people, we have certain regulatory powers,

and we haven't exercised them against the EAA farmers.

They've said -- we have a massive -- this project

is huge. We've got pumps that will pump three million

gallons of water in a minute; and they say that those pumps

which pass this polluted water through them need permits

under State law, even though we don't put the pollution in

the water. If there's any in it, it's put in by the

farmers.

They also say that we are violating water quality

standards -- these are all State laws -- in the wetlands

and that there are two contracts, which we claim are not

contracts, but they say they are, that we've entered, one

with the Park Service and one with the Refuge, and that we

are violating those contracts as well, too.

We -- one of the important issues that we've

raised in the case and that's very important with respect

 


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to the depositions like Colonel Herndon's is that this is a

Federal flood control project. It was built by Congress

and the Corps of Engineers back -- beginning back in the

late Forties. The practice In the United States is to have

a local sponsor run the project once it's built, subject to

Corps supervision; and we're the local sponsor. So, one of

the issues we've raised at the beginning of the lawsuit --

and we continue to push it -- is: Why are we being sued by

the United States if the Corps of Engineers tells us how to

run the project and it is this project which is allegedly

causing the pollution?

Now, I agree that doesn't have anything to do

with the argument that we're not regulating the EAA, but it

has to do with all of the rest of the case, for example,

whether or not we've breached the lease with the Fish &

Wildlife Service for the Loxahatchee Refuge. That lease

was entered because this project is a Federal project and

the United States wanted to have a refuge in the middle of

an area where they were also storing water.

Now, one other element that I need to bring to

the court's attention, because it's also important to the

discovery, is the SWIM Plan. There's a State statute

called the Surface Water Improvement Management Act; and as

part of that Statute, we have decided to put together

something called the SWIM Plan with respect to the

 


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Everglades; and in that plan we are attempting to address,

study, and resolve the same problems that the United States

has raised in the lawsuit.

Again, the reason I mention the SWIM Plan is

because you don't need to be Clarence Darrow to figure out

that, when we go to trial, this is going to be our defense.

This is what the District staff has recommended to the

Governing Board which runs -- nine citizens appointed by

the Governor that make all of the decisions for the

District. This is what the staff has said that the

Governing Board has to do to solve the nutrient problem in

the Everglades. Yesterday the Governing Board approved the

first phase of that plan.

So, obviously, at least until the plan changes,

when we go to trial, whenever that trial occurs -- and

there's a lot of scientific information that's referred to

in this report, and there's a telephone book sized

additional volume I didn't bring with me that contains all

of that scientific information -- this is what our case is

going to be. We're going to say. "Judge, this is what we

plan to do. This is what we're trying to do. This is our

scientific basis for selecting this solution to the

problem," and then we're going to live or die on that.

The Government is either going to say that's

adequate or inadequate. They're going to prove that we


uparrow.gif (122 bytes)                                                                                                                                   80

 

cooked up our scientific numbers, they're going to prove

that we disregarded what our staff was saying, or they're

going to accept this.

But, that's what the case is going to be about.

So, when the Government argues that they need

interrogatories to figure out who our witnesses are going

to be or that they need something before depositions to

figure out what our witnesses are going to say, all they

really need to do is read this plan, and then they're going

to know exactly what we're going to say at trial.

Now, I'd also like to very briefly discuss the

history of discovery, and that's for two reasons. One is

there's been a sort of implied theme running throughout the

briefs and the argument this morning that the District has

been recalcitrant in discovery and, in fact, that there's

some kind of strategy we may be employing, that is that we

don't ever really want to go to trial. I don't want to try

to argue over whether that's true or not. I don't think it

is, but I also don't think it helps very much to decide the

discovery issues. The court needs to decide who's entitled

to what and then rule, and we don't need to worry about

whether or not the District has bad motives for not trying

to produce discovery. But, I also want to dispel --

THE COURT: I'll allow it to the extent. Mr.

Jackson, that it's helpful to you. I am presuming, as I do

 


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in this case and other cases, that there has been good

faith on both sides. I'm not -- that may be rebuttable.

but I'm not here to hear a rebutting of that necessarily;

and I'm not too interested in earlier events, except as to

where it's logjammed us here today. I am presuming that

the attorneys on both sides in this case have attempted in

good faith and. if there have been reasons or obstacles,

that there have been reasons for -- or that there have been

reasons for those obstacles and inabilities to cooperate.

I want us to put this on a track here today that we can

complete this case in as expeditious a manner as possible

without really getting into a lot of history as to who did

what.

MR. JACKSON: Okay. Well, I don't -- I only want

to get into the history of who did what just to briefly

relate the amount of discovery that we have produced for

the Government, and it has been substantial, and we moved

very speedily at the beginning of discovery in this case to

produce documents.

We did move for a stay early on in the case of

discovery. We lost that. We invited the Government to

come to our building and tour it, as they said. They filed

a notice to produce documents that had fifty-nine separate

categories in it; and within thirty days of receiving that

notice, we produced seventy-five thousand pages of

 


82

 

documents for them to inspect; and within less than two

months of that production, we produced copies of all of the

documents that they wanted.

That's the way we've conducted discovery whenever

discovery has been conducted in this case, and that's not

the way the Government has been conducting discovery, and

that has led to the problems in this case.

Now, the discovery broke down after I -- this

morning I heard that there were two stays of discovery in

this case. I was only aware of one that occurred during

the summer. The Government offered us a stay of discovery,

and we accepted it. It ended on September 5th. We

requested that the Government extend the stay. They

declined to. So, at that point we commenced discovery

again.

The Government offered to produce documents at

the Park and the Refuge in the first and third weeks of

September. We went to look at those documents; and at the

same time, we started trying to set up deposition schedules

with the Government for just three witnesses. We've never

made any effort to conduct wholesale discovery depositions

of the United States Department of Interior. We haven't

taken the phone directory at Everglades National Park and

asked for everybody in it. So, a lot of their concerns

about us deposing every employee in the Park is not

 


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justified by the record in this case, because we've been

asking, for I guess, seven months now, for three

depositions in a case that's now eighteen months old.

And we tried. We spent a couple of weeks.

Instead of sending out notices for depositions and instead

of sending out subpoenas, we called the Government

attorneys up on the phone and said, "When are -- these are

the three people we want to depose. When are convenient

times? Here is when I'm available. When are they

available?" We sort of went back and forth on that for a

couple of weeks, and then suddenly the Government said,

"No, we're not going to produce these people for

depositions, because you haven't filed an answer in this

case." That's sort of when things started breaking down.

The other problem has been caused -- and this is

rather anomalous and one -- I've never been put in this

position before -- but, the Government did produce

documents at the Park and the Refuge and we inspected them,

but there are two problems with the way that's been handled

so far.

One is that it took five months before the

Government finished copying the documents that we

designated for inspection. And none of the lawyers we sent

to the Park and Refuge had photographic memories. They say

they produced three hundred seven thousand pages of

 


84

 

documents, and I won't dispute that number. No schedule in

this case is going to work if it takes five months for us

to get copies of documents that we designate.

And when we briefed the case, the Government said

the reason it took so long is because they didn't want to

send their documents out to be copied. Well, we ran into

the same problem in the District. We've got as many

documents as they do. But, if we're going to litigate,

then we may have to do things like send documents out to be

copied.

But, the second problem -- and perhaps this is

more critical -- is that the Government never told us what

documents they didn't produce. Even today they keep saying

that they've produced all of the documents at the Park and

the Refuge that are responsive, but they have not told us

what documents are responsive that they claim they don't

have to produce, either because of a privilege or a work

product claim; and that's very critical, too. We can't

assume that we're going to end document production by July

1st if we've still got outstanding issues over massive

claims of privilege.

And you've heard today that someone like Mr.

Shite, who's been involved in this nutrient issue long

before this lawsuit started, at least as far back as 1983,

who we assume will be a key witness for the Government --

 


85

 

they now consider all of his notes as being -- everything

he does, in fact, since August of 1988, when they first

started thinking about this case, to be privileged. Now, I

think that's an over-broad assertion of privilege.

We don't need to decide that, of course, today,

but if there are thousands and thousands of documents that

have been generated at the Park and the Refuge since 1988

that they think are privileged, simply because they're

about the law -- they're about the subject matter of the

lawsuit and they were generated after the lawsuit was first

thought of, then we're going to have a substantial

privilege battle, because essentially we're going to have

to fight to find out what the Government's case is before

the trial is conducted.

And I say that because both the Park and the

Refuge have been studying, like the District, this nutrient

problem and whether it's growing cattails in the water

conservation areas and whether it's going to show up in the

Park at some date or whether it already has shown up in the

Park for years, long before anybody thought it was a good

idea to have a lawsuit. And we assume -- at least the

District has continued to study it pretty much the way they

were studying it before, notwithstanding the lawsuit. We

assume the Refuge and the Park, with their scientific

staffs, have continued to study these problems,

 


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notwithstanding the initiation of the lawsuit.

And we contend that the date that they've

generated about these problems after the initiation of the

lawsuit is not privileged just because they filed a

lawsuit. Why? Because we think they're going to put all

of that on at trial, and we want to see what it is before

the trial starts.

Again, that's not an issue we need to decide

today, but if, in fact, the Government is withholding a lot

of that data -- and from what we've gone through that we

got from the Park and the Refuge, we really don't see very

much that was generated after the beginning of the lawsuit.

You sort of hit a brick wall in the middle of 1988, and you

just stop seeing information after that point. We're not

going to be able to finish document production and think

that we can have meaningful depositions with their

scientific experts unless we've thrashed out these

privilege issues as well, too.

So, that to me is very critical. Any schedule

that we agree to or that's imposed by the court with

respect to document production has got to call for

realistic deadlines for production of copies that are

designated, as well as a realistic deadline after the

discovery session is finished for a privileged list, not

seven months later.

 


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Now, when we-- and notwithstanding the fact that

the Government had basically pulled a surprise move on us

by refusing to allow these people to be deposed, simply

because we hadn't filed an answer and simply because we had

not agreed on a discovery schedule, we went ahead and set

up another document production session for the United

States.

Now, in these two document production sessions,

the one that started in May and the one that started in

October, we gave them all of the information we had with

respect to -- we have a whole department called

Environmental Sciences; and a lot of what they've done is

studied the wetlands that are in the water conservation

areas, for a lot of different reasons, but also because of

this nutrient issue.

We gave them all of their files, and we gave them

all of the files in our Water Quality Department. We gave

them the Executive Office files that they wanted, and we

gave them the files from the Permitting Department that

they wanted. too. A lot of what they've talked about today

that we objected to, we turned over all of the files we

could find on those issues anyway, notwithstanding our

objections. A lot of that's moot now, but we -- that's the

tenor of the information that we gave them before this

discovery impasse started.

 


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Now, we did not give them the documents that went

into the SWIM process, so they didn't have that. I agree

they have not gotten access to the SWIM files. There's no

basis for us to withhold those, and we don't intend to

withhold them from them. We're simply waiting until we can

get discovery going again for both sides, not just ours,

before we disclose those SWIM files, but we have no

objection to disclosing those files.

Now, at the same time, we were going to set up a

discovery session to disclose the SWIM files when the

Government filed -- we asked -- we told them that we had a

date, and we were going to let -- we've heard a lot about

how we continued to provide documents to the agricultural

interests but not to the Government. We invited both to

come at the same time to a session to start looking at the

SWIM documents. The Government said that was not enough

notice. We gave the same notice to the agricultural

people, and they showed up.

Immediately after that the Government filed their

motion for a protective order. They really upped the

stakes with regard to these depositions, and they had

another surprise for us. Now they were claiming that

Colonel Herndon, who's the District Engineer in

Jacksonville, who runs -- who basically runs the Corps in

Florida and, therefore, is the Chief Executive Officer to

 


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supervise our running of the project, and Mike Finley, who

used to be the Superintendent of the National Park in

Everglades, were, in fact, expert witnesses, without

identifying what they were experts at. They then claimed

that this Rule 26(b)(4)(a) protected them from depositions.

At that point, we said, "We've had enough. This

is crazy. It looks to us like you're doing nothing but

trying to stall these depositions." They also said they

didn't think they should start until February 1st. So, we

stopped producing documents for them in formal production

sessions at that time.

Nonetheless, during that period, we continued to

respond to their requests for computer data. Every time

they asked for something that we had in computerized form

and they identified the mode they wanted it in, what kind

of disks and that sort of thing that they wanted it on, we

copied it and gave it to them.

We also gave them twelve years worth of water

quality data measuring the water quality going into the

Park at all of the inflow points that we measure-- that

anyone measures it at that we have that data. We did a

statistical analysis on that, and we've provided that for

them, too.

So, we have not shut down the information flow

with the Park. And I would imagine in a case like this,

 

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which is about water quality violations, what they're going

to be most interested in is data about water quality, what

has it been and what is it doing to the Everglades

ecosystem; and we've already given them all of the

information we have on that.

However, at that time, at the end of October, we

still had not received any of the copies of the documents

from the Park and we still had not received any from the

Refuge. They gave us a computer list that we couldn't

figure out, and we began to ask some questions about that,

and we didn't get answers to those questions.

We then had our motion to -- we argued motions in

front of the judge. Judge Hoeveler said -- we raised this

problem with Colonel Herndon on November 1st. He said, "I

think you should be able to depose Colonel Herndon. As far

as I'm concerned, you can do it. We're going to cut out

red tape. We're going to have that deposition." We still

haven't had that deposition, and we still haven't been able

to schedule that.

One of the arguments that keeps being thrown at

us in that we asked for documents in the subpoena duces

tecum that was to a large extent overlapping with our

document requests to the Corps and the Park and the Refuge,

and that's true. Actually the subpoenas duces tecum were

very narrow. They asked for much fewer documents than were

 


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asked for in our broad requests to those agencies. We had

some specific things we wanted to set at, like we asked

each person -- if they were an expert, we wanted a copy of

their curriculum vitae or their resume, their publication,

list, and a copy of publications. We wanted to figure out

what they were experts at and whether they could qualify as

experts. We may want to challenge whether they should be

able to qualify as experts, which are reasonable discovery

things to do at depositions.

The only reason we asked for documents like that

in the subpoena duces tecums that we filed is because we

still had gotten no copies of any of the documents that

we'd seen at the Park or at the Refuge and we had not set

up a document production session with the Corps, mostly

because the Corps hadn't set one up. We asked for Corps

documents in June, which is not something we thought of

after we started trying to get these depositions. We asked

for the documents in the document production first, and

then we filed the notices for depositions and served the

subpoenas on the Government.

So, we don't care whether they bring the

documents to the deposition: We don't care whether they

produce them in Jacksonville. We just want to see them.

We're not asking to see the same documents twice. We want

to see them once. And I don't know why we need to put

 


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something in the subpoena duces tecum that says, "You don't

need to bring documents you've already brought."

If they show up at a deposition and they don't

have documents we've asked for and we say, "Why?" and they

say, "Because you already saw those before at a document

production session," we're not going to call up the Judge

We're not going to file a motion to compel duplication and

reproduction of documents that have already been produced.

And we only did that because we hadn't seen any documents

yet.

As Mr. Harrison says, maybe we'll think of a few

more documents between the time of the production session

end the deposition, but even if we do that, that's not

going to cause reproduction of the same documents more than

once.

We also had not seen the privileged list, so that

means we didn't even know what we saw at the Park and the

Refuge. We had no way of telling what they kept back. And

they say in one of their briefs that they've been waiting

since June of last year for a privileged list from us. We

didn't withhold anything as privileged in June. We gave

them everything we had in the offices that we went through

in response to their document request.

Now, we were going to give them a privileged list

as a result of the October session, but by then it had

 


93

 

already been clear that we hadn't gotten a privileged list

from them from the sessions that they had held in

September. So, we again couldn't see any reason to give

them a privileged list when they hadn't given us a

privileged list.

THE COURT: Have privileged lists been exchanged

by -- at all by this time yet?

MR. JACKSON: No, not yet. In fact what I'd

like to get to next is that what we really need to do, of

course, is figure out how to get this discovery process

going again; and I can -- I think it's very easy actually.

The court should order them to produce the

witnesses for depositions. We'll agree on times. I don't

think the court needs to set the schedule for that. We're

willing to do it whenever it's mutually convenient for

everyone concerned.

The court needs to order that the privileged

lists for both sides be produced. We'll produce them at

the same time they produce them.

The court needs to tell the Government to produce

the Corps documents in Jacksonville. We'll work out a time

when we can go see those. We'll be happy, to put the

Herndon deposition off until after we've seen those

documents. We don't want to depose him without looking at

those documents first.

 


94

 

They should be required to finish the Everglades

National Park production, for example, to either produce

all of the computerized date or at least tell us what

they've got on computer and what kind of format it's in.

We had a meeting with them in October of last

year. We invited them to bring their attorneys and their

experts -- the United States that is -- but, we also

invited the agricultural interests to the same meeting. We

brought our experts. They all -- the -- our experts sat

around and talked about what kind of computer information

we have. They talked about bits and bytes. They used all

of the computer jargon. None of the lawyers had any idea

of what they were talking about, but at least the computer

experts in the room were all talking to each other about

the District's information.

The Justice Department expert said, "You've got a

lot of stuff. I think we need to narrow our request." We

said. "Fine. Tell us what you want. You'll get it." and

we've been giving it to them on that basis ever since.

We still don't know what they have on computer.

They still haven't -- they gave us a list that's been

useless. We've asked a number of questions about the list

for the Park. They've given us no list at all for the

Refuge. We have no idea of what the Refuge has on

computer.

 


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THE COURT: Which list are you now talking about?

MR. JACKSON: They produced a list of computer

information. It had about a hundred and fifty entries on

it. It said at the top, "Nine-Track Tapes."

Now, the District has lot of computer

information on nine-track tapes. We've got a lot of

computer information in just about every other conceivable

type of computer mode you can put it into. Again, I can't

describe all of this. It's way beyond my understanding.

But, you've got all sorts of software and different types

of methods of recording information on computer, and you

can mix them around and make it easier to get information

out of one type by transferring it to another and all of

that kind of stuff.

All they've given us is a list of what they claim

are their nine-track tapes. A lot of the categories were

empty. For example, there would be a name, but there would

be no description of what was on the computer tape. So, we

had no idea of what this tape was. We didn't know whether

we wanted to copy it and look at it or not. So, we sent a

letter, and we asked a lot of questions. We said, you

know, "Fill in the blanks. Tell us what other computer

information you have. Is it all on nine-tracks tapes? Is

this all of it, or is there more? And where's the list

from the Refuge?"

 


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The same thing with maps. We told them initially

we didn't went to produce maps that we had not completed --

vegetation maps. Now, we've been trying to make maps to

establish what the vegetation is like in these areas.

And by the way, that area I just showed you, with

the EAA, the water conservation areas, and the Park, is

forty-three hundred square miles; and the information that

we're fighting over today comes from all of that

forty-three hundred square miles.

They want information that we have about what

practices are going on in the EAA and how that affects

water pollution, and that's legitimate stuff for them to

ask for .They want all of the studies we've made in those

wetlands with regard to water pollution and vegetation.

We're talking about fifteen or twenty years worth of

studies, because we've been doing this for a long time.

We've got thirteen hundred employees in our district.

They even want stuff we know about the Park, and

we do have some information about the Park that I guess

they don't have. And again, it's not a question of whether

they can have it or not; it's just trying to come up with a

manageable way to produce that information and to make it a

two-way street and also to put some reasonable limits on

where we look for information and how far afield we have to

go.

 


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We've tried to put -- impose a cutoff in this

case, so that geographically the discovery requests are

limited to south of Lake Okeechobee. That's what the

lawsuit is about. Our district runs all of the way up to

Orlando. We have sixteen counties in this district.

The United States has said, no, they want

everything we have on wetlands anywhere in that area; and

we've said, "That's ridiculous. We've got more information

about nutrient impacts on Everglades wetlands then anybody

could ever absorb. That's plenty. Why do you need to go

to other wetlands and figure out what nutrient impacts are

there?"

They responded in one of their briefs by saying

that we've done studies of nutrient impacts in other

wetlands. Fine. All they have to do is identify the

studies, and we'll be happy to give them the information.

That's a far cry, though, from saying, "We want everything

you've got on wetlands and nutrients and vegetation," which

is the way they described things in their request, "north

of the Lake."

So, again, I just use that as an example of where

we've tried to put some limits on what we give them --

define those limits, so that at some point we can say,

"We're finished. We -- with our objections. where we said

we won't give you anything north of the Lake, but within

 


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the scope of those objections, we've given you everything

we've got; or at least we gave you everything we could

find."

The same was true with regard to the argument

about divisions and departments and where we looked. We

looked where we thought we were going to find the

information. There were times when the Government

mislabeled a department or a division on its request.

I'm from Washington. I'm an attorney in a

private firm. I know nothing about this district before I

start doing this lawsuit. The first thins I get is this

request for production, and I have to figure this district

out and figure out where your documents are. So, I was

probably more in the dark then their experts were as to how

this district works and what kind of information they've

got.

We simply went around and asked questions.

Sometimes we discovered that the United States had

designated the wrong department or division; and when that

happened, we went to the right department or division; and when that

got the documents. We would be walking out the door of

someone's office and they'd say, "By the way, you should

talk to Joe Blow down the hall. He's got filing cabinets

on this stuff." Reluctant as we were, we would go down the

hall and talk to Joe Blow, and, yes, he had filing

 


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cabinets. That's how we generated seventy-five thousand

pages of documents in thirty days. The people have got

more documents than they know what to do with.

So, even though we have objected to looking in

every file cabinet in the District to find every document

that has to do with this memorandum of agreement, we have

produced numerous documents with respect to the memorandum

of agreement. That's the document that was entered by the

Corps and the Park Service and the District, and basically

it requires us to measure and the Corps to measure water

quality levels at certain places in the Everglades, and it

sets certain standards for those water quality levels, and

then there's supposed to be a report about whether or not

the water quality is meeting those standards or not. They

claim we agreed that we would meet those standards; and if

we don't, we're in violation and can be sued for breach.

We disagree with that.

But, aside from that, basically the MOA is about

water quality. This morning, when Mr. Harrison said what

it -- they want everything on the MOA that could be

anywhere in the District. This morning Mr. Harrison said,

"What we're talking about is we want to know how those

water quality standards got set." They were actually set

in conjunction with the Park, so I don't know why that's a

problem for them. But, assuming it is a legitimate area of


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discovery, they want to know whether or not those standards

have been met in the past, and they went to know

information relating to those water quality standards that

are in the MOA.

As I said, we've given them the water quality

data that we have. When we went through the Water Quality

Division -- and we used to have one called that -- and we

found documents about the MOA, we knew that was stuff to

turn over to the Government. So, when we say we're not

going to look everywhere in the District for MOA stuff, it

doesn't mean we're not going to produce the MOA stuff. In

fact, I bet we've produced what they're really interested

in, because when we ran across it in the places where it

was most likely to be as far as relevant information was

concerned, we turned it over .

We've withheld very, very few documents as

privileged from the Government. In fact, we also went into

our Regulatory Office. We have a huge office that deals

with regulations. They wanted -- and this morning they

talked about all of these memos and policy decisions in the

District. Well, as far as we can tell, there aren't --

there never were any policy, decisions not to regulate

EAA. To the extent they're, not regulated, it's just worked

out that way.

But, we went through the files of the people who

 


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run the Regulatory Division, and they had lots of memos.

They had lots of letters. They had notes of meetings. We

went through those. We turned those over to the Government

at the October session. We pulled a few documents out of

there as privileged, but we turned over all of that stuff.

And that's true for a lot of these requests.

There's the request they have on the EAA. I think maybe

it's 58, 56. It's got several subcategories. Everything

they're asking for, we've already turned over in that. We

just refuse to go -- beat through the entire District, or

we respectfully request not being required to beat through

every filing cabinet in the District to find every document

that may relate to the EAA. It's a huge area, it was there

long before the District was, and pumping water out of the

EAA is a major thing that the project does. Therefore,

there's likely to be some documents here and there all over

the place with regard to that.

THE COURT: Well, how would you limit it? If

you're -- are you -- I'm not sure of the difference between

divisions and departments, but --

MR. JACKSON: Well, we'll be happy to designate

to the Government -- in fact, we already have. That's what

started the dispute -- where we looked for the documents.

We said. "We object to looking outside of these divisions

and departments for these documents." And they said,

 


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"You've got to look everywhere." So, what I would say is

that, if they can point out another division or department

that they think is likely to have relevant documents, then

we can consider whether to look there.

THE COURT: How would they know that? How would

they have any idea of what division or district -- or

department or division there might be a document that

they're looking for?

MR. JACKSON: We've already provided them with

our organization chart, and the divisions have names. I

mean you can tell whether or not, it seems to me, a

division or -- the same way we do -- like I said, I was a

stranger to this -- the way we've decided whether a

District division or department was likely to have

documents.

THE COURT: Of course, lawyers and particularly

lawyers that have a burden to prove a case -- and rightly

to, I believe -- in an abundance of caution, always ask for

everything; and that's, I believe, their position here,

that they can't really tell. While they may agree that to

ask District-wide may be a cumbersome task, their position

here in the papers is that that is a task that, while

cumbersome, is still an obligation on the part of the

District, because, No. 1 -- or for one reason because of

their inability to be able to say, "Well, look in that

 


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department, that division." And that's the problem that

they're presenting to the court.

MR. JACKSON: Well, I'd like to dispel two

notions that were raised this morning. One is that we have

a computerized document system.

THE COURT: It sounded pretty good.

MR. JACKSON: It did sound good. I wish such a

thing did exist. It'd be great. We haven't got anything

like that at all. We sit around and go through ancient

filing cabinets, some of which have documents going back to

1940.

THE COURT: I didn't think any Government agency

had something like that. I know we don't have that here in

the court. But, anyway --

MR. JACKSON: Well, it doesn't exist, so what

we're talking about to find -- if we produce ninety-nine

percent of the relevant documents by looking in the places

where they're likely to be -- and I suppose if they went to

have interrogatories and depositions over how we looked for

documents, then they're entitled to request that kind of

discovery. Given some of the things that have happened

with respect to the Park, we may ask for that kind of

discovery.

THE COURT: Well, how big of a task would it be

to look District-wide for these documents that are

 


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requested here? Is that monumental?

MR. JACKSON: Yes, and that reminds me. I'd like

to dispel another notion that was raised this morning,

which is that we have not sent out a memo basically to

everyone -- not everyone, of course, but to heads of the

departments.

It's -- there's an organization chart. You start

at the top and you work your way down, and we've sent out

memos to various department and division heads and said--

we didn't exactly send around a copy of the Government's

document request, because frankly it's kind of vague and

loose. It's not very well-worded in a lot of places; and

sometimes we think we know what they want, and we can word

it a little better for our people what it is we're looking

for, including making it as broad an possible, because we

don't want to do this again.

Well, we did -- we have sent memos like that

around, and I've sat in numerous meetings with people

trying to figure out where documents are. We've spent

hundreds -- and we've laid all of this out in our first

brief that we filed in support of our motion for a

protective order, and that was in regard to this dispute

about whether or not we were producing -- mixing the

documents up and giving them empty file folders and all of

that sort of thing. We spent five hundred hours,

 


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man-hours, paralegal and attorney hours, trying to find

these documents, figuring out where they were, getting them

labelled so that we could produce them for the Government,

copying them, and getting them back in the filing cabinets.

Now, that is only with regard to looking places

where we think the documents are likely to be. To get that

last five percent to cover the entire District, you're

going to have to double, triple, quadruple, that kind of

effort, because there are vast areas of the District where

we're not looking. They have all of these -- you know,

like any agency, they have huge administrative staffs.

They've got a public relations staff. They've got

engineers that do nothing but figure out how to open and

shut the gates. They've got people that maintain the

buildings and the locks and the dams and all of that sort

of stuff. So, we didn't ask any of those people for this

stuff.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you. If -- having

done all of this work, do you think it's possible that some

of the documents that are being requested which you would

say are arguably relevant are in locations other than

places that you've already looked?

MR. JACKSON: Yes, it's going to be possible. I

will never be able to certify that those documents don't

exist somewhere else.

 


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THE COURT: And the plaintiffs -- if -- as

much -- you may view it as -- I don't know if you use the

term "fishing expedition," but I read it all of the time.

As much as you may view this as a cumbersome task, it's

conceivable that the smoking gun, if there is such a thing,

is someplace other than south of Okeechobee?

MR. JACKSON: No. I don't think there's going to

be a smoking gun north of Lake Okeechobee.

THE COURT: But, some document -- maybe not a

smoking gun then, but some document which would fit within

this document request

MR. JACKSON: Oh, undoubtedly there will be north

of the Lake. That -- we didn't cut that off because we

thought there were not going to be documents. We cut it

off because we estimated that it would double the number of

documents we would have to produce.

And we cited cases in our briefs that say, even

though the discovery rules are written very broadly and say

that a document doesn't even have to be relevant -- it just

has to be likely to lead to relevant materials -- and we

agree, when they ask for wetlands impacts north of the

Lake, it's going to be within Rule 26. I mean it's hard to

imagine anything that isn't within Rule 26. But, we cited

cases where the court said, "Nonetheless, when you start

reaching an area of diminishing returns, where the effort

 


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to the producing party is greater than the likely benefit

to the requesting party, the court has the discretion to

cut that off."

Now. I think it'd be a different case if we

didn't have thousands of acres of wetlands, that are the

same wetlands at issue, that we've been studying, along

with the Park and lots of other people, for fifteen or

twenty years to decide exactly what these nutrients are

doing to these wetlands. And is I said, just the first

round of production produced twenty-five thousand pages of

paper, a lot of it about that issue. Now, if that didn't

exist, it'd be a much different question if we had a report

about a wetland north of thy Lake on the same issue. I'd

agree in that situation. If there's nothing else, then

that's not unreasonable to require a report on that.

THE COURT: So that those documents that have

already been produced -- if the plaintiffs could prove

their case, it could be proven with those documents, even

though there are additional documents potentially.

MR. JACKSON: Absolutely. If we go north of the

Lake, we're going to be talking about different wetland

systems; and there are going to be a lot of arguments made

as to both the relevancy of those documents and their

weight, especially compared to what we already know is

going on south of the Lake; and we can argue forever about

 


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whether we know what's going on south of the Lake.

I think the more -- it's like lawyers. The more

scientists we get involved in this and the more we look at

it, we're just going to have more information and less

agreement about what it means, but there's plenty of it.

There's enough to have a trial that could last two months

solely on the issue of whether or not these nutrients' are

creating a discernable impact in the Everglades that we can

all agree on and then decide what the baseline is as far as

resolving the problem. It would be very easy to have a

very lengthy trial based on information we've already

produced to them and they've produced to us and that we've

given to the Sugarcane League on just that issue, and

that's hardly the only issue in this case.

So, with that kind of effort on our part and that

kind of information already being produced, we think that

it's simply burdensome and harassment to have to go to

other areas like north of the Lake.

And it's a little bit different issue than not

looking in every filing cabinet for every document that has

to do with the MOA. That's somewhat of a different issue,

because we suspect that there are not going to be very many

documents in other places; and if they are found, they're

not likely to be any different from the documents that have

already been produced.

 


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In fact, every time the Government has told us

why they want these documents and why they went us to look

all over the District for them, they've been a little more

specific about what they're looking for, as I mentioned

with the MOA. They said, for example, they wanted to know

where the water quality standards in the MOA came from,

what methodology led to that -- what science, what

research, etcetera, led us to put those standards in the

MOA, along with the Park Service.

Well, if that information exists in the District,

it's going to be in Environmental Sciences, where they

study the biology; it's going to be in the Water Quality--

what used to be the Water Quality Division, where they

study water quality and measure it; and we've already

produced everything those people have, except for the SWIM

documents, that's relevant to nutrients and impacts on

wetlands. In fact, we've produced everything they had on

water quality in the wetlands, whether it was limited to

nutrients or not. We didn't limit it to nutrients.

And we ran across -- we would frequently run

across things having to do with the MOA. An internal memo

that says, you know, "The Park Service wants us to sit

down ..." -- we had an MOA in '79, and it was revised in

'84, and that's what we're being sued over -- the '84

one -- "The Park Service wants us to sit down and decide

 


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what new standards to put in the '84 memo. What do we do?'

"We had a meeting today with the Park Service to decide

what the standards would be on the '84 MOA. "We had a

meeting today with the Park Service," after the MOA was

entered, "to talk about whether or not the standards are

being met."

We gave them all of that stuff. Every time we

ran across that stuff -- and it was most likely to be in

the departments that deal with those issues -- we gave it

to them. So, I can't swear that we gave them everything,

but I would bet we gave them ninety-nine percent of what

they're really looking for that's relevant to the case; and

it just doesn't justify doubling and tripling that effort

to find that last one percent; and again, we've cited cases

that say courts have discretion not to require that,

especially when there's, as there is in this case, a

plethora of information that's clearly relevant to this

case.

I would -- if the parties in this case produced

at trial half of one percent of the documents that have

been produced in document productions so far, this trial

will go on for many weeks; and I have a hard time believing

that Judge Hoeveler is going to put up with that. So, I

think that there's got to be some reasonableness involved

in selecting where we look for documents.

 


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And I'm sure the Government is doing the same

thing. I can't believe they're going through every single

filing cabinet they've got in these agencies to find

documents. They're doing the same thing we are. They're

talking to people, they're looking at the names of file

folders, and they're trying to make quick judgments about

where documents are; and that's -- we're doing exactly the

same thing. We're trying to handle it as rationally as

possible.

I don't think that issue is really all that

important at this point. I think the bigger problem is

that there is a sense that somehow the discovery problems

that have arisen in this case, some of which are the result

of the fact that there's just a lot of information there

and it's hard for all of the lawyers to deal with it,

especially lawyers who aren't themselves experts on these

issues -- there's an awful lot of people involved that have

been working on these issues for a long time, and we're all

struggling to deal with that. We're struggling to deal

with what the United States gives us and we're struggling

to deal with giving it to them from our side as well, too.

A discovery schedule is not going to solve those

problems. The only thing that's going to solve those

problems is that when valid discovery requests are made

they're fulfilled and we don't get into fights about things

 


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like whether or not the discovery production session is

held in a hotel room or in a conference room in the

District, because that really doesn't influence whether or

not the Government is getting the information they're

asking for; and we -- and to spend three hours on the first

day of production, with the United States insisting that we

have a telephone conference call with the magistrate at

that time, instead of sitting down and looking at the

documents we produced, to me seems like a waste of time;

and no discovery schedule is going to prevent that from

happening.

I'm not -- I don't want to say the United States

is solely at fault for the breakdown of discovery in this

case, but the problem has been that, whenever we're ready

to produce or whenever we're ready to basically start

trading information that we want it to work both ways, the

Government raises a problem. For example, we asked for

depositions, and they said, "You can't depose these people,

because you haven't filed an answer in this case." There's

no case law -- there's no authority for that proposition;

and in fact, once we briefed it, they abandoned that

argument. That's one reason why we're reluctant to agree

to telephone conference calls. We think the briefs are

helpful.

On this 26(b)(4)(a) thing, I -- no discovery --

 


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I'm no expert at the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

either. I didn't know -- I couldn't distinguish all of

these subsets, but after we briefed the case, they started

citing cases that said that basically you can protect these

experts; and they cited all of these cases; and they turned

out to be Rule 26(b)(4)(b) cases, not (b)(4)(a) cases; and

there's a big difference, because (b)(4)(b) is to protect

experts who have been hired solely for a consultative

capacity and who are not going to be called for trial.

Nobody in their right mind thinks that the

Government is not going to call Dan Shite to trial in this

case or that we wouldn't be entitled to call him to trial

as a hostile witness. He is their main case agent. He's

done nothing but work on this litigation since August of

1988. He's obviously a relevant issue -- witness. He is

not a 24(b) witness. He's a 24(a) witness.

So, we need to stick to those cases; and with

regard to those cases, we cited the Manuel of Complex

Litigation, which has been cited at least three times this

morning, which says posing interrogatories to depositions,

first, does not make sense in complex litigation. If you

want to do reports by experts, fine, but you've got to

depose experts.

We cited Wright & Miller. It says nobody ever

bothers to depose expert witnesses with interrogatories

 


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first. Why? Because they're useless. Lawyers realize

they're useless. Most of the time nobody even raises that

objection, and numerous courts grant orders allowing expert

witnesses to be deposed. In fact, almost every pretrial

order says, if your witnesses haven't been deposed and you

haven't disclosed them, they're not going to testify at

trial, because the judge isn't going to sit through a cross

examination by an attorney who's never seen an expert

before and had no idea before the trial what the guy was

going to say or what the basis was for it.

So, our position on like these depositions is

that the Government insists on raising these issues, like

whether or not we file interrogatories first, just as a way

to stall; and they've provided objective evidence that

that's going on, because they'll shift from one argument to

the other.

With respect to scheduling and how we should

treat expert witnesses, this morning I kept hearing over

and over again, "All you have to do is ask us in an

interrogatory. We'll tell you who our expert witnesses

are. We'll even give you a summary of what they're going

to say." Why do we need to ask an interrogatory to get

that, if they're willing to give us that information?

Nothing stops them from sending that to us anyway, if they

want to, if they think it's important. We're willing to

 


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depose these people without that.

As I said, Mr. Shite has worked on this issue for

a long time. You've heard that he's published numerous

articles. We have a fairly decent idea of what he knows

and doesn't know about this issue. We've got plenty to

talk to him about at a deposition. We had no trouble

figuring out that he was somebody we needed to depose. And

as I said, with this SWIM Plan, they're not going to have

any trouble with it either; and in fact, they mentioned

several people this morning that they thought would be

likely candidates, because they'd be witnesses in this

case. Every -- these -- everybody knows who everybody else

is in this case with regard to the staffs and the Park

Service and the Refuge and the District. Before the

lawsuit started they were all working on this problem

together as scientists.

I have no problem with setting up a pretrial

schedule or a discovery schedule in this case that says

that at some point both sides will disclose who their

witnesses are and what those witnesses are going to say, a

summary of testimony. I do object to trying to distinguish

between a fact witness end an expert witness in this case;

and again. I 'd like to use Mr. Shite as an example. I

don't mean to beat up on him, but it's just he's -- we know

the most about him, and he provides e convenient example

 


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for this.

But, in 1983 and 1984, he was involved in a

dosing study. Basically, as I understand it, the Park

Service decided to take some Everglades wetlands in the

Park and they started feeding nutrients through that area.

They put polluted water in this area. They had a control

area where they didn't put any polluted water in, then they

had an area that they put polluted water in, and they

started studying what happened. They charted the

difference. They said. "All of these bad things happened

in the polluted area, and they didn't happen in the

non-polluted area." That was like seven years ago.

Now, Mr. Shite conducted -- apparently was very

much involved in the conduct of that study. Obviously, for

our experts to analyze the results of that study, they're

going to want to know a lot of things about the study --

"How often did you polluted water in that area? How

polluted was the water? How did you know chances were

occurring? Did you do a baseline study first? What

methodology did you use to determine the difference between

the control area, whore no polluted water was, and the

polluted area?" Those are all fact questions.

We're going to ask Mr. Shite those questions

because he was there when they occurred. He was an

observer first-hand witness of those questions. He

 


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does not need to render an expert opinion to tell us that

information; and it's information were legitimately

entitled to, because again, we can guarantee you that in

this case the first thing they're going to present to Judge

Hoeveler in their main case in this dosing study. They're

going to say, "We know nutrients cause problems, because we

purposefully dosed the Everglades and it caused problems."

And that's a very important fact in this case.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you how logistically

you would want to work that out then from a practical

standpoint. If you want to go ahead with a witness right

now -- Mr. Shites, is it? Shite.

MR. JACKSON: Shite.

THE COURT: Shite. Mr. Shite is a fact witness.

That's one of the persons that you've, I believe,

previously subpoenaed for deposition. He has not now been

identified or at least not formally as an expert for the

United States in the case. If he later is identified as an

expert, then you would seek to take his expert deposition?

MR. JACKSON: Why not allow the deposition

both purposes to occur at one time?

THE COURT: Well, would you prepare -- perhaps he

is not prepared as an expert witness at this time. Perhaps

he hasn't completed: his review of the matter and would have

to rely on further discovery in the case, other depositions

 


118

 

of other persons and so forts, to formulate his expert

opinions. If that is his reasons to your deposition if it

were to proceed in the next thirty days or sixty days or

ninety days, if he were to say, "I presently don't have

expert opinions. I may later," then what would happen?

MR. JACKSON: We would never be able to resolve

that problem by designating expert witnesses for separate

depositions later or.

THE COURT: So, your problem right now is --

MR. JACKSON: They'll always be able to say that.

THE COURT: Right. But, you're saying you have

no problem identifying witnesses, at least by a certain

point. You don't -- you --

MR JACKSON: Right.

THE COURT: Let me see if I can get this

straight.

MR. JACKSON: Yes.

THE COURT: You don't have a problem -- or you

don't see a need for interrogatories --

MR. JACKSON: Yes.

THE COURT: -- prior to depositions. You don't

have a problem with identifying at some point who your

witnesses are -- and of course, that's standard

procedure -- and then at that time also identifying, I take

it, who your experts are versus your fact witnesses.

 


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What --

MR. JACKSON: That's what we proposed in our

proposed schedule -- is that everybody identifies their

witnesses. Depositions are cut off at a certain point

before trial. If you haven't identified a witness and he

has not been deposed, that is the opportunity was not

provided to depose him, he doesn't -- he's not used at

trial.

Now, as in any case, we're certainly open -- and

I imagine Judge Hoeveler is going to be, too -- to either

moving those schedules around, moving the trial date back

and moving the cutoff up. If the cutoff is passed and

people identify witnesses legitimately that they still want

to use at trial -- the Government calls us up, "We've found

this guy. He's a great witness. We want to use him.

You're going to have to depose him before trial." We say,

"Great. We'll come see him and depose him." Then he's

used at trial, so that we maintain flexibility up until the

time of trial. That's, in my experience, what normally

happens.

But, if Mr. Shite now says, ''I'm not ready to

present expert opinions on matters that ire relevant to

this case," there's nothing to prevent him from saying that

once he's been designated as a witness either, whether

expert or not.


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THE COURT: Now, at some point he would be either

required to or would be -- would have an expert opinion, so

that he would not -- it wouldn't be a subterfuge for sure

from he or anyone else, and I'm not suggesting that he

would do that, but --

MR. JACKSON: I don't see any practical

impediment to going ahead and requiring both sides to

designate fact and expert witnesses. One reason I think

that's true is because, like I said -- and Mr. Shite again

is a good example -- he's been studying this problem for a

long time. The people that we are likely to produce

ourselves or that the Government is going to want to

produce, even if we don't, are in the same boat. You're

going to find stuff cited in here that goes back to the

late Seventies and the early Eighties. There's nothing new

about this stuff. So a lot of people formed opinions a

long time ago in this case -- long before this case was

filed.

THE COURT: But, that's what Mr. Harrison is

asking to do -- at least one of the things he's asking to

do in expert or in interrogatories, and that is to

identify fact and expert witnesses, and you're saying you

don't have a problem with that.

MR. JACKSON: No, I'm saying that there's no

reason why both sides, without interrogatories -- I mean,

 


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so, we send them an interrogatory that says, "Who are your

witnesses?" Why doesn't the court just say, "Both sides

identify their witnesses"? 'These guys are experts. These

guys …" I don't -- I would just say identify your

witnesses and identify those whom you intend to qualify as

experts and identify the areas on which they will testify

and the areas on which you will attempt to qualify them as

experts. Once we've got that list, we've got everything we

need to know to do a deposition, assuming the document

production has been completed.

THE COURT: Is your witness list, both fact and

expert, ready to be --

MR. JACKSON: Well, the only other caveat I would

say is -- and I think this is fair, because we're the

defendants in this ease. The Government should have to go

first, because we don't know who our witness are until we

know what their case is. They should have to disclose to

us what they intend to try to prove at trial and who

they're going to try to prove it with. And then once

we've done that, some period of time, thirty to sixty days,

then we can file our witness list.

But, if I had to put a witness list now, I

couldn't do it, because I don't know what the Government is

going to try to prove at trial. I could try to. I mean I

could sort of guess things like the dosing study, but I'm

 


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not in a position to --

THE COURT: Well, what are you suggesting then?

A preliminary identification of witnesses and then a final

date by which to identify witnesses, both expert and

factual?

MR. JACKSON: It could be done in stages,

although, again, I don't think that's really necessary as

long as there's some flexibility for last-minute -- and

it's not going to be last-minute. We're talking about

months.

THE COURT: Well, the only purpose to identify

witnesses at all, of course, is to allow both sides to

prepare and not to have a situation at the very end where

they have to take depositions and try to find out what --

MR. JACKSON: Right. I know. It's -- yes, I

agree, and I think that most of the witnesses can be

identified that way in this case and with maybe a few at

the end coming in like that. However, I don't know why we

need to wait to have depositions in this case for people

that everyone agrees are probably going to be witnesses in

this case.

THE COURT: That's your main point here -- is why

wait until July 1st to do a deposition when you know who

the person is and you're ready to do that deposition.

MR. JACKSON: Yes, and also I don't think it's

 


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going to be a good idea to tie doing depositions to the

completion of document production, because we've both

established the track record that it may be a very long

time before either side feels that the other side has

completed document production in this case. I

THE COURT: Well, if the court were to set a date

for the completion of first requests -- for example, July 1

has been proposed as a date, which is now about ten weeks

away -- but if that date or another date -- if -- that

will be a date at which time depositions could start,

whether or not that request for production is completed or

all disputes have been resolved on that. I --

MR. JACKSON: Well. I don't have any problem with

that, but I was saying not to tie depositions to completion

of the document production, because I think that's just

going to serve to delay; and if the Government really

doesn't want its witnesses to be depose, all they have to

do in delay the completion of the document production,

which is pretty easy to do, and then we can't start

deposing people.

THE COURT: Well, we're talking here about

setting up some sort of dates -- some sort of dates for

starting things and finishing things -- a date to start,

and perhaps that date could be -- I think your position

would be that date should be as of today that depositions

 


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should be allowed to proceed; and of course, Mr. Harrison

is arguing that it should be a further date down after

completion of the first request for documents -- after the

completion of that document production. But, we're really

just talking about when to start. It's not --

MR. JACKSON: I agree. I agree. I think most of

this is that kind of issue, where it's a question of

setting up dates by which things should start occurring,

but it's natural that we wouldn't oppose that. We've been

trying to depose Herndon since last June, so we don't have

any objection to setting up a date when depositions start,

as long as it's fairly soon, because no one -- at least no

one from the United States has come up with a good reason

not to start them sooner.

Herndon is not an expert on anything. The

Government isn't even trying to argue he's an expert

anymore, so this interrogatory stuff is just another smoke

screen.

THE COURT: And from what I'm hearing, the

dispute is not so much over Mr. Herndon specifically, but

rather just, "You're not doing something, so I'm not going

to do something." And that's what the purpose of this

hearing is, so that there will be things that will be

started more expeditiously.

MR. JACKSON: It's largely devolved to that, your

 


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Honor. I agree.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. What about the

five -- well, let me first address these procedural matters

and then back up into those substantive areas as to

particular matters or particular objections, I believe,

that you made -- that your client made to requests for

production.

But, as far as the discovery schedule is

concerned. I haven't compared those dates back and forth.

But, do you have a comment of any kind as to lengths of

time or, other than what we've already talked about, when

to start things, which -- and I understand your position.

But, how much time do you think that you're going to need

here, and when would you suggest a -- is that -- are you

staying with the dates that you're suggesting in your

proposed --

MR. JACKSON: Well, I agree with Mr. Harrison.

They're going to all have to be moved back five months.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JACKSON: And we're certainly flexible,

specially a month or two in either direction, on any of

those deadlines, particularly if the court makes it

clear -- and I think it should be clear in a case like

this -- that the court will also be flexible if the parties

have a legitimate need, especially if both sides want to

 


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move dates back simply because things have become

unmanageable.

THE COURT: Well, the language that's in both of

yours, I believe -- and that is that a date as set can be

extended by agreement of the parties without leave of court

or by any party with leave of court -- in some ways takes

the court out of it, which is good; and in other ways, if

it's not by agreement, then the court becomes involved. I

think some dates have to be firm and would have to have

leave of court in which to extend, but --

MR. JACKSON: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: -- I think you're agreeing --

MR. JACKSON: I've just been in courts before

where we weren't allowed to do it even when there was

agree " of the parties, and I just don't think this is a

case where --

THE COURT: Well, I think some dates are --

MR. JACKSON: -- where that would be appropriate.

THE COURT: Some dates, I think, are appropriate

that the parties can agree to extend those; and other

dates, such as discovery cutoff dates, should not be

allowed to be pushed. Do you see what I'm saying?

MR. JACKSON: And again, I think that a lot of

the arguments that have been made against our proposed

schedule is that the cutoff for identification of witnesses

 


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or deposition is too close to the trial date. That's very

easy to fix. You either move the trial date back -- and

they want a trial date that's a year later then ours, so

obviously they're not unwilling to do that -- or you move

up the deadline date if that's the problem.

THE COURT: That's not a problem. I think that

thirty days --

MR. JACKSON: But, that has nothing to do with

asking interrogatories of expert witnesses. That doesn't

justify the need for doing that --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JACKSON: -- if that's the only problem they

have with the schedule that we have proposed.

THE COURT: Let's see. I'm not sure yet --

perhaps it's -- perhaps it's -- I don't think it's in the

papers -- but, exactly what the status is of document

production on both sides and what it is -- I understand

what you're saying about certain documents being claimed as

privileged and not knowing which those are or work product

documents and also, although I don't think it's before me

right now, whether or not some of those documents which the

plaintiff is claiming as work product are actually work

product. But, have the plaintiffs now produced all -- or

have they now copied all documents that you have requested

to be copied, other then those that they're claiming

 


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privilege on?

MR. JACKSON: All but forty of them.

THE COURT: All but forty of them? And what's

the forty? Is it -- what's --

MR. JACKSON: The forty is primarily a number of

documents that we took records -- we kept records when we

were going through the document production of what we

thought we were seeing and what we were asking for, and we

compared those records with what we got, and things were

missing.

And there are also -- we -- they gave us a list

of their scientific publications -- it's about forty pages

long, to illustrate the fact that they do a lot of

scientific work there aside from this lawsuit -- and we

checked of various publications that we wanted copies of.

Some of those they've never copied for us. We've done that

for them. We gave them our list -- and we're the same way.

We've got a list of publications -- and told them, "Just

check off what you want, and we'll mail them to you."

THE COURT: Has -- are there any objection -- or

let me put it another way. Have you requested documents --

other than those forty, have you requested documents that

the plaintiff has not yet produced that you believe you are

entitled to have?

MR. JACKSON: Yes, for example, the ones that the

 


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Corps has in Jacksonville.

But that also raises another question with

regard to when we're finished with the document production,

because we haven't only asked for documents from the Corps,

the Park Service, and the Refuge; and we've asked for

documents for all Federal agencies that are relevant.

Now, they've made a lot of arguments about how

that's too broad, and maybe it is. We're certainly willing

to limit it to more relevant agencies, but one thing we

asked for in September of last year was simply a list of

Federal offices that are relevant to this lawsuit that

might have documents in Florida, just so we could get a

handle on how many offices we're talking about looking at.

We're not quite in the same boat. We've only got

really one office. We have a few little sideline offices,

but we're all in one place basically. The Government, of

course has got a lot of agencies, and they're doing a lot

of than in Florida. Some of them are relevant, and some

of them are not, but we've never been able to get that

list.

And some agencies will surprise you. The US

Geological Survey has been involved in the water quality

monitoring in this issue. I don't exactly why. That seems

like an odd thing for them to be involved in, but they have

been. We're certainly not going to leave USGS out if, in

 


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fact, they have relevant information.

So, it's kind of fuzzy to figure out when

document production is going to be completed. They said

that maybe the Interior Department in Washington has

relevant documents. So, we don't know what the status of

that is, as well, either.

THE COURT: Well, and that's the problem that I

have now trying to make final decisions or at least

decisions to resolve and clear up and put behind us the

request -- at least the first production for requested

documents. You use an example; and of course, that in an

example, but it's not the total of the problem, if there is

one.

In the papers that I have, although I have

received some supplementals, including yours, speaking

somewhat in general terms as to what -- how these matters

can be resolved, the most recent being motions to compel

back in October and November of last year -- and Mr.

Harrison, I guess this is for both to respond -- but, is it

presently before me to know exactly what documents have

been produced, which documents have not been produced, the

objections to documents which have not been produced, and

then the response? Is that up-to-date in these pleadings,

or do we have to have that further updated before I can

make decisions as to specifics? You mentioned five

 


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categories this morning. But, are those is that the sum

total of them?

MR. HARRISON: With respect to the substance of

the objections that they had to our request for

production -- and there were some odd -- I don't know --

thirty or forty of them -- those are the only five that we

believe right now that the court should rule against them

on and provide those documents. We reserve the right to

open up the others.

With respect to the location of the documents, I

think it is important for your Honor and for all sides to

know -- it's my good-faith recollection that, when their

request was sent to us, we furnished a copy of that to not

only the Park, the Corps, and Loxahatchee, but also to the

Department of Agriculture, to US Fish & Wildlife -- and we

said, you know, "If you have responsive documents, inform

us in thirty days" -- and that it seems to have settled out

that it was the Corps, the Park, and Loxahatchee that had

them.

I have no problem whatsoever with again inquiring

whether they have responsive documents. And when I put the

July 1 date down for end of first round, it's always been

my understanding that all the District really wanted to do

was to go to the Corps.

The system has been set up that we're not sending

 


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documents there. They don't want all fourteen file

cabinets that we may have identified as responsive in the

Corps. We've both agreed to that. We'd be buried in

paper. What happened -- the way the system has been

working -- and we have all agreed to it -- is that we

identify them, they then go and review all of those

fourteen file cabinets, tag or bait-stamp which of the

responsive documents they want, and then those are

photocopied.

For instance, out of the three hundred and fifty

thousand we have left to look at at the District, we're

certainly not going to take them all. We're doing to

review them and decide -- and they may all be responsive.

Some may be relevant, and some we may feel may be

irrelevant, but we'll identify the most critical of those

that we need and take them.

That is what they have never yet requested to do

at the Corps. We've talked about it. They keep saying we

haven't provided the Corps documents, Judge. We can't

provide them, unless they want all fourteen file cabinets,

until they go up and look at them; and they haven't

requested a session, but, yet, they want to depose Herndon.

And they say on one hand they can do him with documents,

they say it without, and now they say that they ought to

have the documents first. Whatever they want, fine. We

 


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think they should have a duty to look at the documents

first or be bound by a stipulation that they will not,

after they look at those documents, depose Herndon.

There are -- there may be documents elsewhere.

We have requests to those agencies. We'll send the thing

again, but we did it, and as far as we have known, the

responsive documents have settled in that they are at the

Park, the Refuge, and at the Corps of Engineers in

Jacksonville.

THE COURT: All right. Now, Mr. Jackson is going

to file something shortly as saying -- that quotes you, Mr.

Harrison, as saying, "Whatever they want, fine," and I

heard it here, and --

MR. HARRISON: That's modified, Judge.

THE COURT: And I also think Mr. Jackson will say

it hasn't been quite that simple --

MR. HARRISON: No, it hasn't.

THE COURT: -- and I understand that there has

been a problem. But, I need to know -- Mr. Harrison has

identified those five specific requests and his position as

to those five specific requests, which I think you have

already responded to in your papers. I need to know --

MR. JACKSON: I can respond to them further now,

and I'm ready to do that.

THE COURT: Well, if you feel it's necessary.

 


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MR. JACKSON: Well, I didn't mean to make more

argument. I think a lot of this stuff has already been

provided or will be. That's what I meant.

THE COURT: All right. Then let's go through his

first then. But, then, what I was getting up to is: What

requests have you made for documents which have not been

responded -- you mentioned the Corps documents, and Mr.

Harrison responded by saying, "They're there. Go look at

them, and tell us what you want." I need to --

MR. JACKSON: We've been unable to set up a

schedule, and I don't agree that they've been offered to us

and we've refused them.

THE COURT: Well, they have been as of today. I

just heard it.

MR. JACKSON: Okay. I agree. So, I think we

should set up a schedule to go look at them.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that's something I think

that you can schedule amongst yourselves.

MR. JACKSON: Right.

THE COURT: Mr. Harrison is not objecting to your

going there, if that's what it takes, and looking at these

things, marking them, and copying them; and it's going to

take less than -- because my order is doing to require it,

not that it should have to -- but, it won't take five

months to copy those documents if --

 


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MR. JACKSON: I don't --I -- your Honor, I would

be willing to guess that most of what we're looking for is

probably going to be in those offices, but, however, we'd

still -- we'd be very interested in the results of their

survey as to what other documents exist in Florida; and

that's what we've been trying to find out, not because --

THE COURT: Is that one of your requests? Is

that a specific request that you have made?

MR. JACKSON: Yes. Well, that's one that we've

made to the Government and that I'll be happy to include in

our motion today.

THE COURT: Well, how would you like us to

proceed with what you have requested that they haven't now

yet produced? Can you identify those?

MR. JACKSON: I -- yes, your Honor. I would say

that they need to finish the Park production, the forty --

THE COURT: Do you have the numbers of these

things, so that I can refer to your request -- or maybe I

don't even have your request. But, go ahead and just

describe them for me.

MR. JACKSON: Okay. To complete the Park

production -- and that includes the documents that haven't

been copied yet that we asked for. That's very minor -- to

provide us with the information about what they have on

computer at the Park and the Refuge. Just tell us what it

 


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is. We're not saying we want it all. We just want to know

what to ask for -- that's responsive to our request. If

they've got stuff on the computer -- if they've got stuff

on the computer that's not within our request, then we're

certainly not interested in even having it described to us,

but just tell us what you've got that's responsive.

We want to see all of the maps that they've got.

We'll -- whether -- if they want to say that their maps are

incomplete and won't show them to us, then fine, we won't

show them our incomplete maps. If the court orders that

both sides have to show incomplete maps or all maps,

whether they're complete or not, we'll live with that. We

just want it to work both ways.

We didn't -- we saw one map when we were at the

Park and Refuge, a vegetation map -- I'm not talking about

like a road map -- a map that purports to chart where

cattails are or where impacts of nutrients have been

documented; and they said they wouldn't copy it for us.

They said it was copy-written. So, we've -- and we've got

a lot of that kind of information, too; and we haven't

shown it to them.

I think both sides should be ordered to produce

whatever they've got that shows where vegetation is. We

showed them a lot that we do have. We Just didn't show

them the ones we weren't finished with, because we haven't

 


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ground-truthed them. We haven't gone out on the ground and

figured out whether we really think that's where the

cattails are or not, something you really have to do for a

map to be of much use in the courtroom.

We also went them to produce a list of all of the

documents that they did not disclose to us at the Park and

the Refuge but which are responsive, and we'll do the same

thing, and I think that should be -- the court should key

that to the date of the production session. It

shouldn't -- I don't --

THE COURT: -- privileged and work product

documents?

MR. JACKSON: Yes. I don't think it necessarily

has to be the day we show up with the documents. Sometimes

that's not practical. Sometimes we're still trying to

decide what we really want to invoke a privilege on while

we're producing the documents. But, a week, two weeks,

three weeks, thirty days, after that session, both sides

should have to disclose what they didn't produce -- that

they pulled as privileged -- not everything they didn't

produce, because we're working through this in stages, of

course.

But, whatever was in the files they checked that

was responsive but was not produced, they should be

required -- both sides should be -- to identify each

 


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document with respect to who it went to, who it came from,

what it's about, and the date of it, and what format it's

in if it's not a piece of paper -- if it's a letter or a

memo -- the sort of things that just are sort of routine in

most litigation.

And we want the court either to set a date by

which depositions can commence or allow us to depose these

three parties -- witnesses. We're not asking -- we have

not tried to depose anyone else in the case, and we have

not resisted -- and they haven't filed any deposition

notices, but we haven't resisted allowing our people to be

deposed. And I don't think they're going to want to live

with that 24(b) argument when they try to depose our sixty

or seventy experts that they seem to think we have.

I'm looking for my list. I think it would also

be helpful, particularly if we're going to have a cutoff

date by which the District has to have produced all of its

documents in response to their fifty-nine category

requests, for the court to decide the issues of what the

limits of that request are. In other words, do we have to

go north of the Lake, and is -- will it be adequate for the

District to certify -- and we've cited cases where courts

have only required this much -- to say that we looked in

the places where it was likely for those documents to be

and not require us to certify that we've turned over every

 


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document that has to do with, say, the MOA or the EAA or

something like that.

And I can go through the categories that they

mentioned this morning and tell the court exactly what we

have and intend to produce, and I think most of the time --

most of the objections we made to their requests were

attempts to clarify the request by making them more

specific. They would have vague language in there, and

we'd object to it as vague, and then we'd -- then we

attempted to rephrase their language and produce what we

thought they were really looking for.

If I don't know what the request is really

looking for because the language is vague. I can't ever

certify that I responded to it, that I gave them all

responsive documents or listed responsive documents that

I'm not giving to them in a privileged list; and we're

never going to know it's over until we're able to do that.

THE COURT: Well, is that something that you

think that, as to those five areas -- Mr. Harrison, I'd

appreciate your response on this, too. Is that something

that's simply a misunderstanding between the attorneys as

to what's being requested by the United States here and how

things -- certain things are defined, and so, therefore, it

could be worked out by just your talking about it and

deciding which -- what it is that you're really asking for;


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or is it that there's an objection -- I've read the

objections -- but, is -- that there would be an objection

other than work product and attorney/client privilege

there?

MR. JACKSON: I -- my feeling is that it won't be

worked out entirely among the attorneys.

For example, they've asked for these memoranda or

decisions or orders that fall within Florida Statutes

120.53. What that Statute basically requires is it sets up

a certain class of things that agencies produce, mostly

decisions -- I assume what they're interested in is

regulatory decisions -- and they have to be published.

Florida has a version of the Federal Register. They have a

State thing that publishes administrative decisions. It's

contracted out. We contract it to a printer to print ours.

They're printed. They're a matter of public record.

They're indexed. You can go look them up, just like you

can look up something in the Federal Register.

THE COURT: Then what's your objection? That

they're matters of public record or --

MR. JACKSON: Right. And if that's really what

they're looking for, they can look those up as well as we

can. All we're going to do is sit down with the same

public record and try to find all of these things. If they

want them, they should have to go look them up. It's like

 


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asking the United States to produce stuff that's in the

Federal Register.

MR. HARRISON: Can I respond to that for just --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HARRISON: -- just -- for that particular

one.

We sent Ms. (Unintelligible), one of our

attorneys, to the library and spent two days looking at the

FALRS -- that's what they're called -- the Florida

Administrative Law Reports, which really didn't get cranked

up until about 1978. Our request predates that. But, the

other problem is unless it just simply hasn't been

published. The fact that the Statute required them to do

it doesn't mean that they have done it.

She didn't find anything of any relevance that

there had been administrative hearings or orders in there,

which surprised us, so we felt that we did have the

obligation to say, "If there is some administrative

hearings or orders which should have been published, but

regardless of whether they were, we went a copy of them."

We do know that throughout the States some of the

water management districts have had administrative hearings

and orders. DER has had. We found it very surprising that

we couldn't find them, and maybe Ms. -- maybe she was

looking in the wrong place, but she was looking at what

 


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information we had was in the FALRs.

So, we asked for those from the District, and I

don't think there's anything improper about that. Much of

the information that we're providing each other is public

record information, your Honor, that has been circulated

all around.

I would like to at least respond to some of

those -- some specifically.

THE COURT: Okay. But, I want to have Mr.

Jackson finish first telling me what it is that -- or if

you have further responses as to these five specific

requests --

MR. JACKSON: Well, again, on that particular

response, the only other thing I heard this morning that

told me what they were looking for when they said

administrative orders was notes of meetings in which people

sat around and decided whether or not to regulate the EAA.

As I've said, to the extent we've got that kind

of thing, we went to the Regulatory Department, we went

through their files, and we've produced all of that stuff.

We gave them all of their letters, every -- all of the

memos, all of the junk they had in their filing cabinets.

A lot of it, I'm sure, wasn't very responsive, but we

turned it all over. We found stuff in there that seemed to

be what they were looking for, and I'm sure they did, too.

 


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They asked for copies of things.

The only other thing they've identified is

documents that they say are required under 120.53, and that

Statute requires that certain documents be published. I

don't know if they're looking in the right place or not,

because I can't remember exactly what -- I think it's

called the Florida Administrative Law Weekly, and I've

never looked at that. I don't know what's in there or not.

But, if what they're asking for is what's required to be

published there and it's not published there, then our

position is we don't have them. Otherwise, they're

basically asking us to go look for documents that we were

required by law to publish and that, in fact, we haven't

published.

I've asked my people. They say they haven't

broken the law, they haven't failed not to publish things

they were required to publish. If that law went into

effect in 1972, then, to the extent they're asking for

stuff required by that law, it doesn't exist before 1972,

because it wasn't required before then.

The gist of my argument is that I know what

they're looking for. They want to know when we sat around

and decided not to regulate the EAA. Now, I deny that

occurred, but assuming that it occurred, we have given them

access to the documents that are going to have those

 


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smoking guns, if they exist, in them. They're not going to

be published in the Florida Administrative Law Weekly, or

maybe they were and they apparently couldn't find them. I

think it's a dead issue. We've given them what they're

looking for.

Now, again, we have not looked in every filing

cabinet in the District to find every memo that might

relate to whether or not the EAA should be regulated. You

know, if we're going to have to do that kind of a dragnet

in the District, we'll have to do it for everything else,

like the MOA. It will be months before we're able to do

that.

And we haven't even started going through

archives materials yet. They told us that they wanted what

we already had in the filing cabinets and they didn't want

to go through archives yet, and we haven't done it. We're

dealing with the tip of the iceberg, especially if we keep

these requests as broad as they insist on their being.

I'm only asking that we try to narrow it somewhat

so we can get this over with with a minimum of effort,

although even a minimum we're still talking about hundreds

of man-hours of time to get this kind of stuff; and we're

producing lots of documents.

We are willing to produce for the Government, as

soon as we get this started again, all of the documents

 


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that we've been producing for the Sugarcane League over the

last few months; and to date that's about five hundred

thousand pages of documents; and we'll give them everything

we've given the Sugarcane League.

If we've been able in less than a year to

generate five hundred thousand pages of documents, there

seems to me to be little likelihood that, in fact, there

are very important documents floating around that we

haven't uncovered yet -- that they may be -- and I'm not

saying that it's impossible that they exist. I'm just

saying that that's a fairly heavy-duty effort, and it's

produced a lot of stuff that both sides -- and I mean the

Sugarcane people as well -- are very interested in.

At these document production sessions, they want

thousands of copies. We do, too, when we went to the Park.

We asked for thousands of pages of paper. So, we're

obviously seeing what we're looking for -- both sides

are -- and I think to try to find the last needle --

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Harrison (inaudible) --

MR. HARRISON: I wholeheartedly agree, your

Honor, that they are, but there is one fundamental problem

on -- and it's a double check -- in Mr. Jackson admitted

they took our request and then the lawyers summarized that

request and sent those memos around to their division

heads. We took their request as it was written and sent it

 

 


146

around.

Some of the requests, they are a little vague;

and some have these scientific words of art in them.

Undoubtedly their scientists helped to prepare those

requests. Ours certainly did ours. And what may not mean

something to the attorney may mean something to a division

head; and his example is exactly perfect -- that they had a

request and by word of mouth said, "Oh, Joe Blow has these

documents." and they coughed up seventy-five thousand

documents. Had that word of mouth not occurred. those

documents may never have been provided.

It's a very small thing to ask to say circulate

the actual request that we sent them, vague as it may be.

to the division heads who know their own files, rather than

to try to guess.

THE COURT: From what I'm hearing, though, it's

not a small request and that, if it were to go

District-wide, that it would take months, as Mr. Jackson

points out, and hundreds of man-hours to complete a search

for perhaps an additional five percent of those documents,

of which Mr. Jackson says many of which have already been

produced, at least in substance, in other documents that

have already been produced. Are you still seeking

District-wide production?

MR. HARRISON: No, what we're seeking, your

 


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Honor, is that the division heads would at least have the

opportunity to compare the memo that Mr. Jackson wrote that

attempted to summarize our request for production and then

see what we actually wrote. If that triggered a difference

in his mind or if there was something in our request for

production that Mr. Jackson and the trial lawyers failed to

summarize properly, he may know his files well enough to go

to which file cabinet. If in that division head's mind he

says, "Well, they look the same to me. We've already

produced it. No problem," then that's okay, but it's a

small double check to simply make the division heads

actually read what we wrote.

THE COURT: All right. Are you willing then to

restrict your -- or to limit your request to documents

geographically to the south of Okeechobee?

MR. HARRISON: Well, I hope your Honor noticed

that, in the five areas I identified, the related wetland

systems was not one of them. So, yes, have virtually

accepted the fact that we will go south of the Lake.

If we want to narrow the request -- and that's

what they've been asking -- there's clearly only two

things -- specific areas that we want -- is that, if they

have proof -- if they've studied, for example, the Bony

Marsh or in the Upper Kissimmee Basin -- that they have

proof that nutrients will damage a wetland system or if

 


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they have proof that they can or cannot regulate

agriculture north of the Lake -- because if they can

regulate agriculture north of the Lake, they can regulate

it south of the Lake. Those are the two guts of the

issues. Anywhere in their jurisdiction, if they have proof

that nutrients are damaging the wetlands or they can

regulate agriculture, we're willing to restrict that

request that narrowly north of the geographical area

involved in this lawsuit.

Those are the guts of the lawsuit. We don't want

all of the water quality data. We don't want repetitive

studies on just simply that parafytin is the base of the

food web or whatever all over the whole jurisdiction. But,

on the two guts of this issue, that nutrients in fact

damage this wetland system -- if it damages the wetland

system up there, it's going to damage the wetland system in

Everglades National Park.

And those are relevant; and I think that, if

they're willing to work with us, we can perhaps narrow some

of these other requests, but we have to have some

information, for instance categories of documents that they

have.

THE COURT: Well, the purpose is now -- it

sounds -- it -- I mean, I'm hearing that the five items

that you're pursuing here, Mr. Harrison, are documents that

 


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would not be found outside of the south of Lake Okeechobee

area. Is that correct, Mr. Jackson, I mean, as you

understand where these things would be located?

MR. JACKSON: Well, not entirely. I mean, I

agree that there may be studies about wetlands impacts

north of the Lake. That -- in fact, when we asked them --

we talked to the people that had this -- these documents,

seventy-five thousand pages; and we set this geographical

limitation up on our own. The attorneys did, because we

had to make it manageable; and we said, "What if you took

that off, how much stuff would we be talking about?" They

said, "You're going to double it."

THE COURT: Are divisions located throughout the

District, or are they all located in one particular place?

For example -- or more specifically. Mr. Harrison says that

he would like all division heads to see the actual document

request, rather than the paraphrase or the explanation of

that.

MR. JACKSON: Well, one of the reasons we didn't

do it that way is because, for example, No. 4 asks for

effects of nutrients on water quality, sediment

characteristics, bioda (phonetic) in an Everglades marsh or

related systems. When we showed that to people, they said,

What is a related system?" That meant nothing to them.

When we asked the Government what Everglades

 


150

 

marsh or related systems meant, they said, "Everglades

marsh or all other wetlands within your jurisdiction." So,

every time we tried to get them to explain to us what it is

they want, it gets broader, not narrower; and so, we

started imposing our own limitations, just to make it

reasonable and objecting to it being broader.

And I would also like to comment that the way

this issue this morning has been handled is very

characteristic of the way -- of why we've had problems

reaching agreements with the United States. For example,

we got into a big fight about whether or not we were going

to use a hotel room and whether or not we were going to

bring the documents over in a box. They wanted to go look

at all of our filing cabinets, which we just -- it just

seems crazy to us. But, anyway, we thought we reached an

agreement on that.

We had a big fight, we went in front of the

magistrate, and we filed papers. Finally, everybody

decided this was crazy, "Why don't we just reach an

agreement about how we're going to do it, "and we did. And

now, this morning I hear that what actually happened is the

Government thinks that issue is moot for now and they're

reserving their right to continue to object to it at some

point down the road.

I think those kinds of issues should be resolved.

 


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If the parties resolve them by agreements, then we stick to

the agreements unless the circumstances wildly change and

there's some reason to let one party out of the agreement;

or the court decides them, and we live with them and we go

forward. If the court decides that we're not going to do

documents north of the Lake and we don't do them, then

that's it.

Now, if something comes up to change the facts at

some point in the future and that looks like that's a bad

idea, then, of course, a motion to reconsider is proper.

But, if the parties are going to agree on things, we're

going to have to have agreements that we all stick to.

Almost every time the Government has filed a

brief since we agreed on how we were going to produce

documents, they've complained about the way we've produced

documents. That's not fair to us, because they keep trying

to prejudice the court and make it seem like we're trying

to bamboozle them, even though we thought we reached an

agreement in which they were going to accept a certain

method of production.

And they've produced their documents virtually in

the same way, the only difference being they didn't rent a

hotel room, but they still brought them in in boxes. We

didn't look at them in filing cabinets. We don't want to

look at them in filing cabinets. We can't figure out what

 


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earthly value there is in going through these people's

offices. It's enough work for us to have to do it before

they look at them. I don't know why they want to do it.

But, we simply -- that's just impractical, as far as we're

concerned; and they have no right to do it that way.

But, that's one of the reasons we're having

problems reaching agreements. If Mr. Harrison is willing

to say this morning, "Let's forget about related systems.

We'll stick to what we've asked for, and we're not going to

raise that issue," fine, let's forget about it. If he's

going to say, "Let's forget about it for now, and then six

months from now we'll decide whether we really want to

forget about it," how are we going to know when document

production on just the first request is over with, if

they're going to keep saying, "Well, we may raise this

issue later on."

We'd like to know now so we can go through the

District, find the documents, tell us what we're supposed

to do, and then we can say. "It's over with." Otherwise,

it'll never be over with.

MR. HARRISON: I'm willing to resolve that issue

by simply the -- only studies which directly show the

nutrient impact -- nutrient. I don't care about pesticides

or anything else north of the Lake. We know pesticides

hurt water. Whether the nutrients have, in fact.

 


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damaged -- are shown to have damaged wetland systems that

are within their jurisdiction. I think that's extremely

relevant, regardless of where that study is -- or documents

to show that they can or cannot regulate the agricultural

introduction of those nutrients into the water. That is a

very -- that is very -- there's a reason for this.

For instance, the St. John's Water Management

District has been able to regulate. Quite frankly, your

Honor, the EAA is an extremely powerful political lobby.

There is some reason that other agricultural areas in the

State have been regulated, at least to some degree. There

is some reason that the EAA has not. If we can show that

they have the ability to regulate in areas that perhaps are

not as able to put up as strong a resistance, then at least

it proves our case that they can regulate the EAA. That is

central.

We don't care about any peripheral issues, only

those two main issues north of the Lake; I'll be bound by

that. We'll restrict the related systems only to the

issues of direct nutrient impacts and the ability to

regulate.

THE COURT: All right. Now, you're getting very

specific for my purposes, but -- or perhaps a little bit

beyond --

MR. HARRISON: I know it is.

 


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THE COURT: -- my familiarity with this case.

MR. HARRISON: But --

THE COURT: But, what exactly are you agreeing

to -- or what --

MR. HARRISON: We'll agree to the -- on the hotel

thing as well.

THE COURT: But, I'm not talking about that.

We're talking about --

MR. HARRISON: Okay. On the related --

THE COURT: Which documents north --

MR. HARRISON: The related wetland systems?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HARRISON: Okay. If they have documents to

show direct adverse impact on wetlands anywhere in their

geographic jurisdiction, we want those documents, because

we fear that they're going to be raising a defense that

it's hydraperiod (phonetic) and it isn't nutrients. We

want to disprove that .

THE COURT: Which request are you now referring

to? Do you know the number of that request?

MR. HARRISON: The related systems -- do you have

that, Susan? As I recall -- is that in the reply?

MR. JACKSON: 4 and 5.

MR. HARRISON: Okay.

MR. JACKSON: It's just -- it looks to me like

 


155

 

it 's just 4 and 5 --

MR. HARRISON: Is it?

MR. JACKSON: -- although, of course, those are

two of the broadest requests they've made.

MR. HARRISON: Well, but, I'm trying to narrow

that down extremely, I don't want pest -- I don't want

general water quality data. I don't want studies for storm

water runoff or how to regulate golf courses or anything

else in the north -- in the systems -- and there is a ton

of that. The District has a lot of varied duties -- but,

studies showing that nutrients destroy or adversely affect

the wetlands. That --

MR. JACKSON: That's what it already says. It

already says that.

MR. HARRISON: Well, of course, it says that, but

I think that your argument has always been that it says

much more then that and it was too vague; and I'm trying to

narrow the request; and I think that that is narrow. I

don't know how that I can narrow it more than that.

MR. JACKSON: If I may, your Honor, what I would

like to suggest in response on this particular issue is

that in one of the briefs the Government said, "We know

that there have been studies conducted on this issue north

of the Lake that have proven that water quality does have

impacts on -- nutrients on water quality. If they'll

 


156

 

identify those studies -- they just mentioned one it

sounded like this morning. They seem to know what they're

looking for. If they would just say what it is, we'll

provide it, and we have no objection to it, if they'll

identify what they're looking for. But, the objection we

have is to just a broad-based request in an area that's

outside the relevancy of the lawsuit. That's all. That's

our argument.

MR. HARRISON: It's not outside if they expect us

to be able to know what studies they've completed. If they

want to provide us a list of the studies that they've

completed, we'll narrow the request in that regard, but I

cannot glean what studies they have done.

I did mention the Bony Marsh study because I've

seen a reference to it in one of the documents. That was

maybe fortuitous. We got the document. Maybe you've

already supplied documents in that area. But, Judge, I

don't have any way to select that.

THE COURT: Let me try to broaden this up just a

little bit then. Are you saying, Mr. Harrison, that, other

than Requests 4 and 5, you're willing to restrict your

request to a geographical area south of Lake Okeechobee?

MR. HARRISON: Yes, your Honor, that and -- now,

other then those two issues -- those issues -- the

regulatory issue, your Honor. pervades through a great deal

 


157

 

of the request for production, for instance in the Request

Thirty -- I believe it was 31, 33 -- Regulatory

Administration -- anyplace they have regulated agriculture,

and I mean regulated agriculture for water quality.

The District has essentially four types of

permits they can issue; consumptive use, which regulates

the use of water by farmers; the management and storage of

surplus water permits; storm water runoff permits; and then

DER regulates what's called discharge of water into State

waters. Those are the guts of this case.

If they have regulated agriculture in other areas

of their jurisdiction but for some reason have not

regulated the EAA, that is central to prove our case. We

can't give that up. It shows that they are for some reason

not regulating the very area we're complaining about. We

know they haven't regulated the EAA.

THE COURT: Okay. So, I'm trying to be as

specific here as possible about which specific requests you

are limiting and which you are not by agreement; and then,

of course, I'll make a decision here. But --

MR. HARRISON: Okay. I'll see if I can't find

the -- the 4 and 5 that Mr. Jackson was talking to, they

are broad. It talks about bioda in Everglades marsh or

related systems. Forget bioda. Forget sediment

characteristics. Forget anything that doesn't directly

 


158

 

impact regulation -- excuse me -- nutrient effects on the

wetland systems. Now, I know that that may still be broad,

but that is the central issue in our case.

If they have -- they have sixteen counties in

their jurisdiction. If we can show that they, one, know

that nutrients are the problem and that it isn't

hydraperiod, and if, two, they show that they have the

ability to regulate that problem, what difference does it

make whether it's in the EAA or whether it's north of the

Lake? The fact is they haven't regulated it in the EAA.

There's nothing better in the world to prove it than if we

could find that they've regulated some farm north of the

Lake. Our whole contention is that it's -- they've not had

the political wherewithal to regulate the Sugarcane League.

And Judge, we can't give those two guts issues

up, regardless of where they exist.

THE COURT: You're talking about still on

Requests 4 and 5?

MR. HARRISON: Yes, 4 and 5.

Now, 4 -- these were not regulatory issues, 4

were meeting notes and so and so on -- the effects of

nutrients, water quality, sediment characteristics, bioda

in Everglades marsh or related systems. These are

biologically related requests.

5 -- let me see what it says -- relating to

 


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effects of hydraperiod on water quality characteristics,

bioda of marsh and related systems. The reason that those

are relevant, regardless of where, is we are completely

aware that the District -- we know that the agricultural

interest is claiming this, and I think Belle Glade and

Clewiston probably will if they're allowed to get into that

area. I don't think they will be, but -- the District is

clearly going to claim that -- at least we think -- that it

isn't just nutrients, that it's hydraperiod; and therefore,

since the Corps of Engineers regulates hydraperiod, in

other words the quantity and timing of the water, that it's

really all the Corps' fault.

It's central to our case to prove, as Walt Dineen

(phonetic), their former deceased chief of their water

Quality Division, said, "It's nutrients. It ain't

hydraperiod." He said it on videotape. He said it to the

Board of Directors.

We want to prove their scientists have known

that. Their Board of Directors has been told that. And if

they raise the hydraperiod as a smoke screen defense in

this trial, we want every piece of ammunition to show that,

no, they know that's false. It's nutrients. They've known

the problem, they know the source, and they should regulate

it. It's central to our case. I can't limit that

nutrients or the regulation of agriculture to just the EAA,


uparrow.gif (122 bytes)                                                                                                                                 160

 

because they haven't regulated the EAA.

THE COURT: Okay. Any others, other then those

two?

MR. HARRISON: Judge, other than the -- well,

19 -- let me look at 19, Water Resources Division -- 19 --

excuse me -- Water Quality Division -- internal memoranda,

meeting notes, other documents relating to effects of

nutrients, water quality, sediment characteristics. That

is the same request of the other division.

I think that a ruling that they have to at least

be responsible as a single defendant, the same as the

United States is agreeing to be responsible, and they can't

shelter behind the fact that the documents may, in fact, be

in another division, that'll solve that problem. There is

absolutely no justification for saying that the United

States has agreed to be responsible, regardless of where

the documents are located in the Federal Government, but

that somehow the District doesn't have to at least be

responsible, because it may be in one division that we

didn't guess.

THE COURT: I understand your position, but what

I'm asking for --

MR. HARRISON: It's --

THE COURT: -- is those items that you are

willing --

 


161

 

MR. HARRISON: Yes.

THE COURT: -- or agreeing to limit in those --

MR. HARRISON: Okay.

THE COURT: -- or the other way around. Which of

these requests do you believe should be District-wide?

MR. HARRISON: Okay. 19 is the same request.

It's just that we had it pigeonholed in another division.

That should be District-wide, but again, we're willing to

limit that rather than the somewhat vague term of bioda,

but clearly (a) nutrient impact on wetland systems,

regardless of what division it's in, and the regulation of

the introduction of those nutrients by agriculture.

MR. JACKSON: Again, your Honor, we actually

don't object to producing the information south of the

Lake, regardless of what division it's in. We were doing

that anyway.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JACKSON: It's a geographic problem, your

Honor.

THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. JACKSON: Okay.

MR. HARRISON: Our problem with it. your Honor,

is, if they have for some reason not regulated south of the

Lake but they have regulated this problem north of the

Lake --

 


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THE COURT: Right. And that --

MR. HARRISON: -- then you're taking our proof

away from us.

THE COURT: Right. Well, that's what I'm asking

you. Which of these numbers do you -- which of these

specific requests do you wish to expand beyond north of the

Lake?

MR. HARRISON: Okay. The regulatory

administration questions that begin at 31 all of the way

down to 35. We cannot afford to not get regulatory

information, regardless of where it is, as long as it's

regulating the problem that we're complaining about. I

guess maybe that sounds simple to me, because we've been in

this darn case for so long.

But, positions analysis -- for instance, 33. It

says positions analysis, documents regarding implementation

of DER delegated storm water authority, or the basis for

any exemption to the EAA landowners from surface water

management. That restricts it to the EAA.

MR. JACKSON: And the same is true for 31. It's

restricted to the EAA.

MR. HARRISON: Yes. and it is. Let's look at

34 -- positions, opinions. analyses, or documents regarding

incorporation of water quality requirements and the

consumptive use permits. That has to be District-wide.

 


163

 

One of the points of contention between us, your

Honor, is that the United States believes that -- see, they

have issued quite a few consumptive use permits to the

agricultural interests in the EAA, but they've not required

any water quality conditions as part of those permits. We

believe that there's State law and there are rules that

clearly say that they should be using the consumptive use

permits to also regulate water quality.

If they have anywhere District-wide used any of

their permitting authority to regulate the quality of water

by agriculture, whether it's the use, the storage, or the

discharge of those waters, it's central to our case, and we

cannot give that up.

MR. JACKSON: I don't think we objected to 34 to

limit it to the EAA; and my recollection is, when we looked

for those documents, we did not limit that to the EAA.

THE COURT: Meaning limit it then geographically

to --

MR. JACKSON: Yes, but we did only look in the

Permits Department.

MR. HARRISON: And that's what bothers --

MR. JACKSON: We're also looking in the Legal

Department, too, for those documents; and we'll produce

them if they're not privileged.

THE COURT: Okay. Any others?

 


164

 

MR. HARRISON: Your Honor, Walt Dineen, for

example, was in the Water Quality Division; and I know a

lot of his documents talk about the fact that they have the

authority to regulate and they should be regulating.

We don't want them to decide which division we

should -- our request should go to.

MR. JACKSON: We -- we --

MR. HARRISON: I think that that is basically

unfair.

MR. JACKSON: They new all of Mr. Dineen's

files --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. JACKSON: -- regardless of what their subject

matter was.

THE COURT: Let's try to wrap it up then here.

What further do we need to discuss?

MR. JACKSON: If I can just have a minute to go

through my -- the notes I made.

THE COURT: All right.

(Mr. Jackson examining his notes.)

MR. JACKSON: Maybe the best thing would be for

me to go through -- and I'd be willing to stop at that

point -- the specific requests that we haven't already

talked about just now --

THE COURT: All right.

 


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MR. JACKSON: -- that were raised this morning.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.

MR. JACKSON: My notes show we've -- I think

we've beaten 33 and 34 to death.

37 -- we will produce 37. We've objected to that

before. but we'll produce it.

56 and 57 and then 59 -- 56 -- as I said, the

District actually, although it's grown since that time,

exists to run this project. Therefore, at least for a long

time in our history, in a way, everything we had related to

the Corps' supervision of the District.

Nonetheless, we have identified certain areas.

In other words, we found the people that deal with the

Corps on a regular basis, at least the people in the

District who open and shut the valves every day and run

that microwave system that Mr. Harrison was talking about.

We asked them how they knew what to do every day. "How do

you communicate with the Corps? How do they tell you what

they want you to do?" They said most of it's in these

manuals, that we're -- that we will provide.

Some of it is in something called a General

Design Memorandum. That's like a hundred volumes of books.

most of which are the size of phone books. They're

basically engineering drawings for all of the structures in

the project, and they set forth what those structures are

 


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going to be used for. Those are in our library. Anybody

that wants to can come to the library and look at those,

and we'll make copies at fifteen cents a page.

THE COURT: Which request are you referring to

now?

MR. JACKSON: 56.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JACKSON: The Corps in Jacksonville also has

a copy of those documents.

Now, there are some, again, file drawers full of

correspondence, memos, notes of meetings, and that sort of

thing, dealing with various -- maybe disputes isn't the

right word -- but, just the coordination with the Corps on

how to run the project. We've found those. I think there

are two file drawers basically of that. Those are in the

offices of the people that open and shut the gates. And

we'll produce that.

Again, this is just like many of these other

requests. I can't guarantee that that's everything the

District has with respect to its coordination with the

Corps, but we haven't uncovered anyone else who's likely to

have that kind of material that we haven't already run

across in all of the other divisions we went through. And

we found quite a bit of it in other places that we looked,

and we've turned all that over.

 


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So, this is on-- of those where I think we're

giving them ninety to ninety-five percent of what they're

looking for, with a fair amount of effort. We have to keep

in mind, of course, that this is the Corps of Engineers

we're talking about, so the Corps is likely to have a copy

of every single one of these memos and letters and things

if they went to the same meetings. But, if we've got

meeting notes, we'll give them. We'll give them what we've

got that we've been able to find in response to 56.

MR. HARRISON: Your Honor, maybe I can at least

narrow those two if we would do it on an item-by-item

basis.

56 -- Mr. Jackson is exactly right. When it

talks about the District's discretionary authority in

relation to the Corps of Engineers, there is an O&M

manual -- they call it -- an operation and maintenance

manual, that would have been given to the District by the

Corps of Engineers; and certainly the Corps will have a

copy of that -- as to how -- as to when the major

structures in this system have to be opened or closed when

the water levels hit certain points at certain times of the

year. That, we don't care about. The Corps has that.

If, however, the District, within its own

internal regulation of the water levels, within that level

of discretion, has any of its own manuals as to how -- what

 


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criteria it uses to manage those water levels within that

discretionary authority, we do want that. We, of course,

are not going to ask them to provide something that's

sitting the Corps' office. So, I don't have any problem

with that. But, if they have their own stuff with respect

to how they operate their own discretionary authority in

56, we definitely want that.

The item in 37 is a little different. It's

called operations Control Manual, dealing with these fifty

microwave controlled structures.

THE COURT: He's agreed to produce 37.

MR. HARRISON: Yeah. and I think that is uniquely

theirs, and we do want that.

THE COURT: 57, I believe that, Mr. Jackson, you

have no objection to?

MR. JACKSON: Yes, 57(s) and (b) -- I believe

that, to the extent we've got that sort of information and

it's in our Water Quality and Environmental Sciences

Departments -- there's also a bridging -- there's a

super-department above that -- and we've produced all of

those files or will produce them as well. I'm not aware of

anywhere else to look for that kind of information in the

District.

(c), I don't know -- I think economic research is

too broad and too vague. I don't know where to start

 


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looking for economic research. There have been some

economic -- there has been some economic information in the

Water Quality and Environmental Sciences Divisions, and

that was produced.

The reason I keep going back to that is because

obviously they're interested in the EAA because of its

alleged environmental impact on the water conservation

areas. To the extent we've got information that deals with

the alleged environmental impact, including things like how

they manage water in the EAA -- there's a big issue as to

whether or not that's why there's pollution, and there's

been a lot of study of that.

The study and the work that we have and the

reason we have it with respect to the EAA is going to be in

our Environmental Department, and that's where we looked.

That's why it seems imminently logical to us to cut it off

with looking in the places where it's likely to be. They

want it because they think it proves environmental harm.

We looked at the places where people study environmental

harm to see if they had it. Sometimes they have

information about the EAA.

We've got come contracts that we've been doing to

try to study the impacts of water management practices in

the EAA on phosphorous and nitrogen downstream. In fact,

that was one of the things that they specifically requested

 


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during the discovery hiatus, and we gave it to them -- an

update of that project.

On (d) and (e) it's the same thing. Those are

basically subsets of (a) and (b), it looks to me like.

(f) was dropped by the Government in a discovery

conference we had in June of last year.

(g) and (h) -- if we've got water quality data on

the EAA, it's already been produced or it will be produced,

so we haven't excluded the EAA to the extent we have water

quality data. (g) -- I don't really know exactly what (g)

is talking about, but to the extent that they're talking

about flooding and draining fields, for whatever purpose

that's done in the EAA, and that -- the impact of that on

the environment, that's already produced in the areas that

we've already gone over.

And enforcement of water quality standards in the

EAA, that -- it's not clear to me what that is either. I

don't know whether or not they're talking about a policy

decision. Again, they allege that we're not enforcing

water quality standards. I don't know if they're talking

about that or whether they're talking about enforcement

actions against the EAA permit holders. We've never

attempted to produce enforcement files, because we've

never -- we never thought they were asking for that. If

they're talking about policy -- regulatory policy, that's

 


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already covered in the previous request with respect to

regulatory policy; and as I said, we have and will produce

that.

I think 57 basically, to the extent we can figure

out what it is where it's not too vague, is largely covered

by other categories. It's somewhat difficult for us. We

don't have an EAA Department, so there isn't anywhere we

can go to find everything we've got on the EAA, but we have

made it clear to people that we've talked to -- as I said,

we're looking for everything south of the Lake. That

geographic limitation was made clear to everyone we talked

to. They all know what the suit is about; and the EAA is

south of the Lake, so there's no reason to think that

information would have been excluded where we've looked.

59, we continue to object to, because it says

produce all evidence to prove that you're violating water

quality -- I don't know what -- it just says water quality.

I assume standards. We deny that we're violating water

quality standards, and we've cited case law that says that

a plaintiff cannot ask a defendant to produce documents

that prove the plaintiff's case when they're so described.

If they went to describe what they think it takes

to violate a water quality standard and say, "Produce those

documents," they're entitled to do that, but we're not --

we think that the law doesn't require us basically to

 


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provide documents and say, "All of these documents are ones

that we're providing in response to 59, and they prove that

we've violated water quality standards," particularly when

we deny that that's true, and we don't know how they intend

to prove that we have violated water quality standards.

But, with respect to water quality in water

conservation areas in the Everglades south of the Lake,

we've provided everything we have or we will when we

produce the SWIM documents. So, presumably, if the

violations are proved somewhere in those documents, they

can figure out what documents prove that and, I guess,

argue them in front of the judge.

MR. HARRISON: Your Honor, may I respond to at

least 57 through 59 specifically?

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HARRISON: 57 -- Mr. Jackson's analysis of 57

I think points out one very good thing -- is that neither

Mr. Jackson nor I nor the lawyers are expert enough to

fully understand some of the terms of art. He pretended

not to know, or maybe he didn't know. I take -- I'm sorry

about that -- detention and retention of water in the EAA.

Those are terms of art that the scientists in those

divisions are going to know what that means.

On-site detention or on-site retention is one of

the things which may ultimately help the water system here,

 


173

 

if the farmers retain some of their water and reuse it for

recycling -- things we think they can require and they have

not.

I don't believe it's legitimate to have any of

the lawyers screen this request, attempt to summarize it

with their limited knowledge, and then provide that

screened request to the division heads. The divisions have

a right to at least see this. We have that much of a

right.

For example, he says the economic research ought

to be in the Environmental. Most likely, if they have a

Planning Department -- they plan projects -- it'll be there

as well.

How -- should we be held hostage to Mr. Jackson's

determination only to submit that memo to the Environmental

Section, when there may well be something in the Planning

Division? Neither he nor I have that expertise. That's

why we said that this thing has got to be District-wide.

We've taken that responsibility. They have let the

scientists that know tell us these are too vague or tell us

through Mr. Jackson, and -- so, it has to go District-wide,

first off. Everything in 57 is critical.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HARRISON: 58 -- first off. on 57 he says

that we've somehow given up (f). If he can show us that,

 


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even informally in writing we've done it, we do. I don't

recall it, and Ms. Ponzoli doesn't recall giving up 57(f).

If we've done it, we'll not go back on our word, but we

have to see that we've done that.

58, ell documents related to temporary operating

permits -- your Honor, DER sure thought their structures

had to be permitted once, because they put a temporary

operating permit on them in '79, and they never met water

quality standards. It expired, and they never tried to

renew it. They know exactly what temporary operating

permit means. If they don't, their scientists do. If

their scientists see it. we'll get some response. If

they've already responded, great.

59, addressing water quality violations -- there

are such documents. We've appended a document to the

opposition to the motion to dismiss where DER says that

discharges are violating three specific water quality

violations -- the biological diversity impact, violating

the conversion of flora and fauna, and I think it was the

dissolved oxygen violation.

There are such documents. If they have internal

documents where their scientists have told them that these

discharges or this water is violating water quality

standards, we have a right to those. This isn't a criminal

case. There's no Fifth Amendment here. If those documents

 


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exist, we have a right to see them. They're central to our

case.

We will not give up anything in 57, 58, or 59.

If they want us to try to narrow 57 to explain it, fine,

but let the scientists look at it first. The scientists

might not have near as much trouble understanding those

terms as Mr. Jackson has had or supposedly.

THE COURT: All right. Let's talk for a minute

then, if you have a comment, Mr. Jackson, about No. 50,

which is also --

MR. JACKSON: Which one, sir?

THE COURT: 50, I believe. Is that it, Mr.

Harrison?

MR. HARRISON: Let me see. 50?

MR. JACKSON: Oh, yeah.

MR. HARRISON: Oh, the lease and the --

MR. JACKSON: Well, with respect to those, again,

to the extent that there have been environmental problems

either in the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge -- and

that's Water Conservation Area 1. That's the oblong area I

showed you a little while ago, and that's the area that's

covered by the lease. To the extent that there have been

environmental problems related to water quality in that

area, those were included in the documents that we produced

under Water Quality and Environmental Sciences, which is

 


176

 

the Biological Department.

We don't have a division or a department that

deals with the lease. We don't have a division or a

department that just deals with WCA-1. We just pump water

into and out of it. The Fish & wildlife service runs it as

a wildlife refuge. And we have looked both in the Legal

Department -- we have expressly looked in the Legal

Department for all of the documents that we have that

relate or could relate to the Loxahatchee lease, and we

have looked in all of the environmental areas for all

documents that could relate to the water quality problems

in WCA-1.

Again, I think that covers ninety to ninety-five,

perhaps ninety-nine, percent of everything that the

District has with respect to that lease -- the lease was

signed in 1951, by the way -- or it certainly covers

everything that's most likely to be relevant in this case,

because it deals with either our legal position on the

lease or it deals with environmental problems that have

been created by the management of Water Conservation Area

1.

The MOA, the same thing. We looked in the Legal

Department, and frankly we haven't found very much. Nobody

paid much attention to these documents, because we never

thought they were the sorts of things you could get dragged

 


177

 

into a lawsuit over. We didn't regard them as being

binding contracts in that sense, so the Legal Department

hasn't really had a lot to do with them, but we looked

there because that's where you might find, I suppose, a

memo that says, "These are binding leases, and we better

live up to them."

But, again, with respect to environmental

problems, which is what the case is about, we looked in the

environmental departments. We found a fair amount of

information about the MOA, especially in the Water Quality

Division; and that was all turned over.

Again, the only objection is to going through the

entire District to try to find every document that might

relate to either of these two contracts.

MR. HARRISON: We're not asking for that, your

Honor. We're simply asking that the Water Management

District, as a defendant, be responsible as a whole for

complying with the requests; and the easiest way to do it

is to simply circulate this request to the division heads

and let the division heads, from our request, tell Mr.

Jackson, in a memo or whatever, "No, we've given you

everything we have," or, "We haven't." It is not up to Mr.

Jackson to make that decision.

I have never in my life seen a case that says the

defendant is not responsible as a whole for the documents

 


178

 

production. You can't simply isolate -- now, they may have

a Recreational Department that supervises the gym.

Obviously, it would be foolish to send this thing there,

and we wouldn't care about that.

But, it's not up to him to decide which division

may or may not have documents, just like it's not up to Ms.

Ponzoli or I to decide that, "Well, we don't believe that

the Department of Interior will have any, and we're not

going to send it there," or "Corps of Engineers, just do

your Planning Department. Don't send it anywhere else."

We sent it to the Corps of Engineers and said, "Circulate

this request. If anyplace in that building in Jacksonville

has responsive documents, we want them listed, and you

start getting them together."

All we're asking for, one, is what we've agreed

to do and what -- two, what the law has always required to

do; and three, something that virtually is no burden

whatsoever. It means their department heads are going to

have to sit down with this, take fifteen minutes and read

it, and say, "Mr. Jackson, we have provided the answers,"

or "We didn't see this. We didn't realize they wanted

detention and retention. Yes, we have documents on that."

That's all we're asking. There's no burden, and we have an

absolute right to at least that type of production.

We're not asking that division head to go scour

 


179

 

all of his filing cabinets, but let's vet the people that

know their files -- the division heads know what they have

in their files -- to tell us these documents don't exist,

not the attorneys trying the case.

I'm sorry to be insistent on it. It's a

fundamental fairness idea. I just can't conceive of a

ruling that says they're not responsible as a defendant

District-wide.

THE COURT: All right. My notes reflect that we

have at least discussed -- touched on all of the specific

items that the Government has asked here to -- the court to

make a ruling on. Anything else? And I do want to wrap

this up in the next five or ten minutes, but -- or sooner,

but --

MR. JACKSON: Well, I can do it in one minute.

And just on that last point, I don't think that's an

accurate statement of the law; and we -- in our brief, the

reply briefs that we filed back in June or July, when we

were going through this initially, we laid out what we

thought the legal standard was. It is basically -- it

doesn't say anything about whether lawyers can write

summaries of document requests and provide them to division

heads. It just says you only have to look where you're

likely to find it. And we cited cases where people were

being requested to look in branch offices all over the


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country where documents might be but weren't likely to be.

And we're just asking -- we think it's a very

clear legal standard, and we think that the court should

impose it here, and we'll be happy to live with it. I

don't see any point in beating it this morning, because I

don't think we're ever going to reach an agreement between

the parties. We'll just stand by what we've said in our

briefs.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. JACKSON: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further from

either side?

MR. HARRISON: Your Honor, just one thing. I

would specifically again want Mr. Jackson to write down an

order that requires them to produce the executive staff

meeting minutes.

THE COURT: Well, we have --

MR. HARRISON: And that is very specific.

And regarding the forty documents we failed to

provide them at the Park, as I alluded to earlier this

morning -- and I know you're drinking through a fire hose

right now with all of this -- but, it was Inadvertent.

Either the Park failed to send it to the copier, either a

whole box or a file. It's forty documents out of some

three hundred and seven thousand that have been produced.

 


181

 

Mr. Shite, I don't know if he's found them, but

yesterday he was down there looking for them; and we're

going to get them to a copier, and this time it isn't going

to take four months. That was a logistical problem for

which we apologize. We beat the Park over the head on it.

They wanted them in-house, as scientists are; and they've

had trouble with their scientists as well. Scientists

don't quite understand the pain of being in a litigation

We finally got them. They sent them out for

production, and they're going to send them out for

production at any other time. But, that was a logistical

problem that was our fault. It was logistical, although it

wasn't our fault as far as intentional, but it was and we

apologize and it's not going to happen again.

The hotel -- I just simply have to dispel one

myth. The hotel was different. We had a legitimate right.

Picture yourself as a trial lawyer, sitting in a hotel

room, not at the file cabinets. They bring boxes from two

divisions, Executive Offices and Environmental Sciences.

All of a sudden you get -- and all -- and the first box you

set isn't all Environmental Sciences, and the second one

isn't Executive Division.

If you were in the office, what you would do is

you would take a chronological order. You'd take File

Cabinet No. 1, take that file drawer of this person, and go

 


182

 

through them old to new, old to new, so, as a trial lawyer,

you can maintain a train of thought. If you start getting

boxes from different ages out of different divisions, it

blows it all. There's no way your bait-stamping makes

sense. And we have seemingly resolved that with a tracking

system.

As long as the court orders that we continue to

inform each other where they are and produce them in a

logical order -- all of those divisions -- we'll agree to

that hotel, and we won't reserve that to be open for the

future. And thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I have sat, Mr.

Harrison, in conference rooms -- in hotel rooms like that;

and quite frankly, that's one of the reasons why I'm

sitting here now, rather than sitting there.

MR. HARRISON: We like the hotel room. It is

comfortable. We just want the documents.

THE COURT: No, I'm talking about what a task

that is to go through documents; and on the other hand, I

do see a need sometimes to produce documents in that

fashion. So, because that is not presently before me and

because those hours have already been spent, that's not

something that I have to make a decision on.

I will be probably today entering an order that I

see as appropriate here and probably a separate scheduling

 


183

 

order that sets the dates that I think are appropriate here

for discovery, which I think is within my order of

reference on the case. I will not be setting a trial date

in the case. That's something that Judge Hoeveler will be

doing.

In addition, we have local Rules here, which I'm

sure Mr. Harrison is familiar with and probably Mr. Jackson

is becoming familiar with, that set out various other

requirements for pretrial dates and so forth, which

probably would be incorporated into that scheduling order

or a separate order of some type.

But -- and also. because I will be sending this

out quickly, I think that you'll see where to begin and

where to continue. I'm not much for speeches, although

I -- we're all here working, being paid by the public --

being paid by the public; and so, to the extent that this

can be that these matters can be worked out with the

attorneys, please do so; and to the extent that you need

the court's involvement. I'm here and I will be involved in

this case as needed in the matter

Mr. Jackson, welcome to the Southern District of

Florida, if you haven't so been welcomed; and I also

recognize that you're outside this district and any time

that you come in you have to come in from Washington. Is

that correct?

 


184

 

MR. JACKSON: Yes, sir. And we will do

everything we can to live by the Rules of the local

district.

THE COURT: All right. I'm sure that you --

MR. JACKSON: We've been studying them since we

first started on the case.

THE COURT: The District does not have local

counsel, or does it?

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, we have in-house

counsel who's been representing as local counsel in the

THE COURT: All right.

MR. JACKSON: He's not here today, but --

THE COURT: Okay

MR. JACKSON: -- we can bring him if --

THE COURT: All right. Well, that is a factor,

of course, to consider, too, in determining whether

telephone conferences are going to be permitted and to what

extent they would be permitted.

All right. Well, then, if there's nothing

further, we're adjourned.

THE CLERK: All rise.

(Court adjourned.)


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I HEREBY CERTIFY that, to the best of my knowledge, the

foregoing pages, numbered 1 through end including 184, are

a true transcription of the electronic recording made on

tapes 9OD-44 through 9OD-47 in the above-stated matter.

 

 

__________________              ___________________

     Transcriber                                            Date

 

 


 

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